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REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICING
NIREJ S. SEKHON*
Police departments have broad policymaking discretion to arrest
some offenders and permit others to engage in criminal misconduct.
The way police departments exercise this discretion has harmful
distributive consequences. Yet, courts do virtually nothing to constrain
departmental discretion.
This is because constitutional criminal
procedure is preoccupied with individual officer discretion and assumes
that the most significant decision moment an officer faces is
distinguishing guilt from innocence. I argue that this framing obscures
the vast policymaking discretion police departments wield and the
central choice they confront: distinguishing among the guilty. This
Article identifies the mechanics and anti-egalitarian consequences of
departmental discretion. Departmental discretion has three dimensions:
geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics.
Through these policy choices, police departments are able to distribute
the costs and benefits of proactive policing within jurisdictions. Case
studies of narcotics enforcement and quality-of-life policing concretely
demonstrate how departmental choices create inegalitarian distributive
consequences. I argue that courts and other public institutions ought to
prevent such consequences. This prescription requires conceptualizing
arrests, and proactive policing more generally, in terms of distributive
justice. Unlike dominant theories of criminal enforcement, distributive
justice offers a normative vision that privileges democratic equality.
Distributive justice suggests that, for crimes that are subject to
proactive policing, probable cause alone should not justify arrest.
Rather, police departments should also be required to demonstrate that
*
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a given arrest is part of an egalitarian distribution of arrests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts imagine police discretion in terms of the decisionmaking
latitude that individual officers enjoy.1 Officers make choices about whom
to stop, search, and arrest. Constitutional criminal procedure attempts to
regulate how officers make those choices by prescribing the quantum of
information they must possess regarding a suspect’s likely guilt before they
may intrude upon her privacy or liberty.2 In other words, the judicial
approach to police discretion assumes that individual officers are the
principal discretion-wielding actors in policing and that the central problem
they confront is distinguishing the guilty from the innocent. From this
perspective, it follows that any arrest supported by probable cause is a
legitimate one.3
This Article critiques the narrowly individualistic conception of police
discretion that predominates in law, scholarship, and public discourse.4
Casting the individual officer as the central discretion-wielding agent in
policing obfuscates the arrest’s role as a policymaking device with broad
distributive consequences. If law is to ensure an egalitarian arrest
distribution it should treat police departments, not officers, as the primary
discretion-wielding actors. Modern police departments exert high degrees
of control over individual officers and rely heavily on arrest as an
enforcement strategy. The central problem confronting police departments
is not distinguishing the guilty from the innocent, but rather distinguishing
among the guilty.
Police departments—i.e., administrators and
policymakers—regularly choose to target some offenders and to let others
engage in comparable criminal activity without consequence. This is most
true in the “proactive policing” context, where the police themselves (as
opposed to a victim or some other witness) identify criminal misconduct.
Because criminal procedure is hushed about departmental discretion and
because retributive, expressivist, and utilitarian theories dominate scholarly
discussion of the criminal sanction, departmental discretion is under1

See infra notes 11–29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
3
The Supreme Court has held exactly that. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996).
4
Popular culture is preoccupied with police behavior at the individual officer level: highspeed chases, excessive use of force, and the like are staples for the evening news. And
many people experience “the police” in terms of an individual encounter with an officer;
typically, that encounter is in the traffic context. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC,
2005, at 1 (Apr. 2007) (finding that more than half of all civilian-police contacts occur in the
traffic context).
2
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theorized in legal scholarship. This Article describes departmental
discretion’s mechanics and anti-egalitarian consequences. It then sketches a
normative vision for regulating departmental discretion relying on
distributive justice theory.
I argue that three dimensions of departmental discretion bear on how
proactive policing arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction: geographic
deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics. How different
groups bear the costs and benefits of arrests within a jurisdiction raises
serious questions of democratic fairness.
For example, narcotics
enforcement has swelled America’s prison populations with poor men of
color.5 The pool of prospective narcotics offenders in a given city will
typically be larger than could ever be arrested with complete enforcement.
Offenders’ demographic profile will depend on where in a city police
target—e.g., the race and class profile of narcotics offenders at an elite,
liberal arts college on the urban periphery might be different from that of
narcotics offenders in working class neighborhoods closer to the urban core.
Departmental choices about geographic deployment, enforcement priority,
and enforcement tactics determine whether and how these areas are
targeted.6 I argue that police departments tend to make such choices in a
manner that generates unjustified inequality.
Normatively, I argue that courts and scholars should conceptualize
arrests, and proactive policing more generally, as a distributive good.
Criminal enforcement’s moral legitimacy is typically grounded in
retributive, expressivist, or utilitarian theories. These theories offer little
guidance on how to accommodate egalitarianism in proactive policing. On
the other hand, distributive justice’s central preoccupation is with how
political institutions in a liberal democracy should achieve an egalitarian
distribution of the benefits and burdens that collective political existence
generates.7 Distributive justice animates discussions in various policy
contexts and I argue that the same should be true for police department
discretion. That discretion is most pronounced in the proactive policing
context where there are few legal or political checks on departmental
discretion. Distributive justice suggests that the mere fact of a criminal law

5

See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
67, 104, 112–13 (1995); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing a case study focusing on narcotics
enforcement in Seattle).
6
Individual officer bias would have no bearing on the arrestees’ demographic profile.
See JOHN C. LAMBERTH, LAMBERTH CONSULTING, DATA COLLECTION AND BENCHMARKING
OF THE BIAS POLICING PROJECT: FINAL REPORT FOR THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 57 (2006) (finding no evidence of profiling apparent in
minority neighborhoods).
7
See infra notes 271–272 and accompanying text.
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violation is insufficient to legitimate proactive policing arrests. The costs
and benefits of arrest distribution, just as with other policy choices, should
be shared equally amongst all communities within a jurisdiction.
Distributive justice principles also dovetail with a representationreinforcing theory of judicial review. In tandem, the two suggest a much
more active role for courts in constraining police departments’ discretion to
ration arrests.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II demonstrates how scholars
and courts have addressed the police “discretion problem.” Legal scholars
have not systematically accounted for how departmental discretion
operates. This is unsurprising given that constitutional criminal procedure
has narrowly conceptualized police discretion in terms of individual
officers’ assessments of individual suspects’ likely guilt. Part III argues
that departmental policies regarding geographic deployment, enforcement
priority, and enforcement tactics drive proactive policing’s anti-egalitarian
consequences. Case studies on narcotics enforcement and quality-of-life
policing demonstrate departmental choices’ salience in producing
inequality. Part IV evaluates departmental discretion through the lens of
distributive justice and concludes that where popular politics is unable to
prevent the unequal distribution of proactive policing arrests, courts should
do so.
II. THE “DISCRETION PROBLEM”
Scholars and courts tend to localize the “discretion problem” to the
moments leading up to and during contact between individual officers and
civilians.
This conceptualization decouples police discretion from
distributive justice—most significantly, it avoids the question of whether
arrest policies’ benefits and burdens are fairly distributed across a
jurisdiction.8 This Section accounts for the decoupling. It begins with
scholars rather than courts. It was scholars, beginning in the late 1950s,
who identified a “discretion problem.” They suggested that police
departments delegated excess policymaking discretion to individual officers
and those officers, in turn, used that discretion inconsistently if not
abusively. Courts and more recent scholarship have continued to echo that
conceptualization.
A. THE “DISCOVERY” OF POLICE DISCRETION

Scholars “discovered” the discretion problem in the 1950s.9 In 1956,
8

See infra Part IV.A.
SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 6–7 (1993) (summarizing early research).
9

IN
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the American Bar Foundation (ABF) issued a report concluding that
considerable discretion existed in policing.10 “Discovery” is a curious
metaphor for describing an endemic feature of policing. But, prior to the
ABF report, scholars and lawyers tended to embrace the mythology of
“complete enforcement”—i.e., the notion that police attempt to apprehend
each and every violator of the criminal code.11 For early law and society
scholars, the discretion problem brought the disjuncture between law and
social practice into stark relief. Early discretion scholars problematized the
disjuncture at its most primary level: the individual officer.
Early discretion scholars cast the discretion problem in terms of an
inverted pyramid. Ordinarily, one would expect the most senior members
of a governmental institution to enjoy the greatest discretion. In police
departments, early police scholars contended, discretionary latitude
appeared to increase down the line of command.12 Kenneth Culp Davis
argued that this, in effect, rendered individual patrol officers “policy
makers” for their beats.13 Davis noted that many police departments did not
have policy manuals at all and, for those that did, the manuals said nothing
about enforcement priorities.14 Taking cover under the rhetorical blanket of
“full enforcement,” police department administrators deferred almost
completely to patrolmen to decide when and against whom to enforce
criminal laws.15 The absence of departmental intelligence as to crime’s
distribution or the nature of officers’ practices compounded the discretion
problem.16 In the absence of departmental directives, patrol officers were
free to devise enforcement protocol based on hunch, habit, and bias.17 The
early scholars were particularly troubled by officers’ decisions not to
enforce criminal laws because these decisions were entirely invisible to
10

See Michael Tonry, Foreword to DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xiii–xiv (Lloyd
E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993) (discussing the origins and influence of the ABF
report).
11
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, at iv (1975).
12
DAVIS, supra note 11, at v, 47, 99, 139; Tonry, supra note 10, at xiv–xv (summarizing
ABF survey); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7 (1968).
13
DAVIS, supra note 11, at 99, 139.
14
Id. at 32–38.
15
Id. at 52–53 (“The police assume full enforcement is required by [statute and
ordinance], and when insufficient resources or good sense requires nonenforcement they also
assume that they must do what they can to conceal the nonenforcement. So the only open
enforcement policy is one of full enforcement . . . . Because of the false pretense of full
enforcement, no studies are ever made to guide the formulation of enforcement policy.”).
16
Id. at 41, 44.
17
See id. at 46–47. “Hunches” and “habits” may be a more polite way of talking about
biases to the extent that officers’ expectations of criminality are racialized. See L. Song
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2042–52
(2011) (reviewing the science of implicit bias).
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supervisors.18
Early discretion scholarship reflects the mid-twentieth century’s
scholarly zeitgeist. Intellectuals were preoccupied with identifying the
“authoritarian personality” in its various guises.19 The vivid memories of
fascism’s horrors impelled scholars to scrutinize the psychological
predilections of individuals who might be particularly susceptible to
populist totalitarianism. Police officers figured prominently as examples of
the authoritarian personality.20 True to the times, intellectuals were not
particularly moved by popular democracy’s capacity for restraining the
authoritarian personality. The ground between popular democracy and
populist totalitarianism seemed precariously slippery.21 It is no wonder that
intellectuals—the early police discretion scholars among them—were quick
to posit political insulation, technocratic rationalization, and
professionalization as the best approaches to containing and directing the
authoritarian personality towards benevolent ends.22
According to the early scholars, the locus of the discretion problem
was the individual patrolman and the locus of the solution was departmental
control. Early scholars posited departmental authority as the best
mechanism for restraining and guiding individual officers. Kenneth Culp
Davis, for example, argued that police departments should promulgate
regulations following public comment, much like administrative agencies
do.23 Other early scholars concurred, arguing for various combinations of
external and internal rules regulating police officer discretion.24 The
analogy between an administrative agency and a municipal police
department is far from perfect.25 The differences between the two may
18

Wayne R. LaFave, Police Rule Making and the Fourth Amendment: The Role of
Courts, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 214–15 (characterizing early
scholars’ concerns).
19
T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1–11 (1950); see also DAVID
ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 29–30 (2008).
20
SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 30, 39–43.
21
Id. at 18–21 (discussing pluralist scholars’ anxieties about mass politics).
22
Id. at 36–37.
23
See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 100, 106, 113–20. Davis argued that individual officers
should have discretion to make decisions in individual situations, but should not have
discretion to make “policy.” Id. at 99, 139. He didn’t, however, precisely articulate the
difference between these two things.
24
See, e.g., GEORGE E. BERKLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 29, 135–36 (1969)
(arguing for internal rules with public comment); WALKER, supra note 9, at 154 (arguing for
better departmental control over individual officers); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling
Discretion by Administrative Regulations, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 504–08 (1990) (arguing
constitutional rules should encourage departments to create regulations).
25
See Ronald J. Allen, The Police And Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle
and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 96–97 (1976).

2012]

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICING

1177

explain why police departments have, by and large, not heeded the early
scholars’ recommendations.26 More significant for my purposes, however,
is that early scholars embraced an officer–department dualism. That
dualism defined the field and continues to inform how contemporary
scholars theorize the discretion problem.
Although early scholars noted that non-white communities might bear
the brunt of the discretion problem’s harmful consequences,27 their concern
about discretion was not expressed in terms of racial disparity so much as
fear of general arbitrariness.28 Even though contemporary legal scholarship
on policing squarely addresses race, it echoes the early scholars’ officer–
department dualism, positing increased departmental regulation as the
answer to the discretion problem.29 Moments of poorly calibrated officer
discretion saturate popular discourse: police shootings, high-speed chases,
and the like make for good news. Even scholars who insist on race’s
centrality in structuring law enforcement priority and protocol tend to
reproduce the officer–department dichotomy. Despite being considerably
more sophisticated around race than early discretion scholarship,30 much
contemporary criminal procedure scholarship still takes the individual
officer as the most relevant unit of analysis.31 Similarly, contemporary race
26

Although most large metropolitan police departments now have policy manuals, those
manuals tend to focus on narrow personnel issues and not on enforcement priority or
protocol as the early scholars had hoped. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES,
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 180–83 (1996); see also Elizabeth Joh, Breaking the Law to
Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 159 (2009)
(discussing internal police regulation of undercover operations).
27
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 11, at iii, 113–20.
28
See id. at 15. The early scholars’ work addressed race in passing. See id. at 161–62;
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 77–80 (3d ed. 1994) (describing research
based on fieldwork conducted in 1962). The absence seems jarring particularly given the
salience of racial unrest at the time and the police’s role in fomenting it. See THE NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 301–07 (1968).
29
See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 506–15 (2003) (noting that organizational culture accounts for officer
behavior and arguing that it accounts for use of excessive force); Erik Luna, Transparent
Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1140–41, 1156, 1167–69 (2000) (noting that excessive
officer discretion leads to racial disparity and excessive force and suggesting department
regulations as one possible solution); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 331, 373–74 (1998) (suggesting that officers are inclined to think that black
motorists are more likely to have contraband).
30
See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 17, at 2052–53 (arguing that recent psychological
theories regarding “implicit bias” explain why police offers may inordinately target
minorities); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987–88 (1999) (using psychological theories of
cognition to account for how officers perceive race).
31
See Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the
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scholars tend to characterize departmental responsibility in terms of
“omission”—e.g., failing to regulate rogue officers or eradicate “cultures”
of racism.32
Some scholars have recognized that police departments are significant
discretion-wielding actors.33
That recognition is implicit in work
addressing the relationship between arrest disparity and narcotics
enforcement34 as well as in work addressing “overenforcement” in minority
communities.35 Scholars, however, have not systematically analyzed the
incidents of departmental discretion or how those incidents specifically
relate to egalitarianism. This may be because scholars take their cues from
courts and constitutional criminal procedure is not especially concerned
with departmental discretion.
Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413,
424 (2009) (noting factors that bear on an officer’s decision to arrest or pursue
investigation); Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43,
75 (2009) (noting that “motivating officers to set aside inappropriate biases” is among the
key solutions to racially disproportionate targeting); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless
Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 233 (arguing that
technological innovation might be a solution to “the potential dangers associated with the
discretion afforded to police officers in their day-to-day activities”); Kevin R. Johnson, How
Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J.
1005, 1007 (2009) (criticizing Supreme Court cases for allowing “profiling by law
enforcement officers to go largely unchecked”); Maclin, supra note 29, at 378 (criticizing
the probable cause requirement because it “fails to diminish the discretion possessed by
officers, but may actually facilitate arbitrary seizures”); Richardson, supra note 17, at 2092–
97 (proposing changes in training and hiring that will reduce officer bias); Thompson, supra
note 30, at 1002 (“Officers must offer race-neutral reasons for their conduct to survive
constitutional scrutiny.”).
32
See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 29, at 523; Capers, supra note 31, at 75; Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 54 (arguing that
improper training and supervision lead to racial profiling).
33
See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 176–77 (noting that massive individual and
departmental discretion is unavoidable); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1969, 2038 (2008).
34
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 265–67 (2002) (noting disparity in
narcotics arrests); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1820
(1998) (stating that aggressive narcotics policing in poor, minority neighborhoods tends to
be an inexpensive way to generate arrests).
35
See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 695 (1998)
(arguing that overenforcement and underenforcement in minority communities undermine
social cohesion and norms); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct
“Outside The Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 665 (2006)
(proposing a solution to overenforcement that uses non-deputized municipal actors to police
minor offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1720,
1772 (2006) (criticizing policy choices that lead to the related phenomenon of
underenforcement and overenforcement of criminal laws in minority communities).
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B. COURTS

Constitutional criminal procedure’s modern origin is rooted in federal
courts’ efforts to contain racist, mob justice in the pre-civil rights South.36
In other words, promoting egalitarianism was among the Court’s chief
purposes in creating modern criminal procedure. Over time, criminal
procedure has increasingly focused on how individual police officers
differentiate guilty from innocent individuals.
Ironically, that
preoccupation has led criminal procedure away from questions of
egalitarianism.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment regulates officer discretion with a view to
limiting searches and seizures that might unduly burden the “innocent.”37
The Court has organized Fourth Amendment jurisprudence around how
officers distinguish the prospectively innocent from the prospectively
guilty. The Court has done so to the exclusion of how individual officers,
let alone departments, distinguish between categories of offenders. And the
Court has altogether written race out of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Fourth Amendment’s requirement of “individualized suspicion”
highlights why courts conceptualize the discretion problem around
individualized citizen–officer interactions.
The Fourth Amendment
requires that an officer have either “probable cause,” or at least “reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts,” that a crime has occurred (or will
occur) before the officer can legally detain and search an individual or her
property.38 In theory, individualized suspicion ensures a quantum of
certainty regarding criminal activity that protects innocent citizens from the
inconvenience and indignity of a police search or seizure.39 Whether
individualized suspicion exists is a judgment to be made by a particular
36

See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1306 (1982); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 56–57 (2000). In the early cases, the Supreme
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse convictions of poor black defendants who
were very likely innocent of criminal wrongdoing. See Klarman, supra, at 53, 57, 61.
37
See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 77 VA. L. REV. 761, 765
(1989) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is interpreted to protect innocent third parties).
38
Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding a search conducted
without a warrant based on probable cause is per se unreasonable), with Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that individualized suspicion based on articulable facts justifies
police intrusion as an exception to the warrant requirement). Because it is a less stringent
standard, “individualized suspicion” permits a less intrusive police invasion than does
“probable cause.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (holding that police intrusion on the grounds of
“individualized suspicion” must be limited to a search for weapons only).
39
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
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officer.40
Under the Fourth Amendment, courts are agnostic on whether the
police target one group of offenders as opposed to another. The Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to be “transubstantive”—i.e., it does not
require that intrusions upon liberty or privacy be calibrated to the suspected
offense’s severity.41 Once an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual is committing a crime, however minor, the officer may detain
and search the suspected offender. The Court has made it clear that it will
not use the Fourth Amendment to restrain even outrageous exercises of
police authority if there is any basis in the criminal code to think that a
crime is occurring.42 The sheer number of criminal laws means that police
have considerable discretion in choosing among different kinds of
offenders. As discussed in detail in Part III below, that discretion is not
best conceptualized at the individual officer level.
If there is individualized suspicion to believe that any crime has
occurred, the Fourth Amendment is agnostic as to whether race animated
the police’s enforcement decisions.43 In Whren v. United States, the Court
held that an officer’s subjective motivation for detaining an individual is
irrelevant to whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation.44 In Whren,
undercover narcotics officers had probable cause to believe that Whren had

40

See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.” (emphasis added)).
41
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 869–70 (2001) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment search standard should account for the substantive seriousness of the offense
being investigated); accord AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 32–35 (1997) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment standard should be linked to
the importance of the government’s purpose in searching).
42
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325–26 (2001) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment permits an officer to arrest for violating a seatbelt law).
43
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
44
Id. The Court has, in a limited subset of search cases, distinguished between an
officer’s subjective motivation and a department’s “programmatic purpose.” See City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44–45 (2000) (distinguishing Whren). Police may
conduct searches without individualized suspicion when the search advances a public
welfare function that, in the first instance, is not simply “crime control.” Id.; see also Illinois
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004) (finding a suspicionless checkpoint stop permissible
where the purpose was to obtain information regarding a hit and run that had already
occurred); Mich. Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (finding a suspicionless
stop at a drunk driving checkpoint permissible because of the state’s interest in preventing
unsafe driving); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (finding a municipal
health and safety inspection permissible without individualized suspicion because the
purpose was not punitive). No published opinion, however, suggests that a court has ever
scrutinized a police department’s reasons for arresting one group of offenders versus another
under the guise of ascertaining the department’s primary purpose.
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committed a minor traffic violation. But the facts surrounding the detention
suggested that the real reason the officers pulled Whren over was not for the
relatively minor traffic violation, but because the officers thought Whren,
an African-American male, had narcotics in his vehicle.45 Departmental
regulations prohibited undercover narcotics officers from enforcing minor
traffic violations.46 Whren argued that, absent the officers’ stereotypedriven assumption that black motorists are likely to have narcotics, they
would not have stopped him at all. The Court rejected Whren’s argument
that the “pretextual” stop violated the Fourth Amendment.47
Whren emblematizes the Court’s refusal to use the Fourth Amendment
to regulate race-based stops or promote adherence to departmental
regulations.48 In Whren, the Court made clear that there would be no Fourth
Amendment consequence if individual officers violate departmental
regulations.49 This, in tandem with the Court’s transubstantive application
of the Fourth Amendment, means that the Fourth Amendment has no role in
regulating enforcement choices that have racial disparity. In Whren, the
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment is the only constitutional check
on such discretion.50
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Nominally, courts are willing to address the racial consequences of
police discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment, but practically, courts
have limited its application by localizing the inquiry to the moment of
contact between individual police officers and citizens. Much like in the
Fourth Amendment context, the “discretion problem” is cognizable as a
Fourteenth Amendment problem when realized at the individual level.51
Equal protection claims have been most successfully advanced in the
context of traffic stops where police use minor traffic infractions as a device
45

Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
Id. at 815.
47
Id. at 813.
48
See LaFave, supra note 24, at 504–08.
49
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815; see also Bertine v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987)
(approving a police regulation that allowed officers discretion on whether to conduct
suspicionless inventory searches).
50
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment.”).
51
The Court has increasingly individualized equality rights in general. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (reasoning that the Equal Protection
Clause “protect[s] persons, not groups”). This is true even in a context like voting rights
where no individual could conceivably have “the right” to select the winning candidate. See
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1995).
46
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for searching otherwise innocent minority motorists for narcotics.52
Advocates for the campaign against racial profiling on the nation’s
highways organized their legal and political message around the indignity
and inconvenience of profiling on “innocent” minority motorists.53 Race is
a bad proxy for guilt.54 And the “driving while black” (DWB) campaign
was successful only to the extent that it helped cement the pithy, popular
wisdom that profiling is “wrong.” The DWB campaign, however, may very
well have consolidated popular and legal disinterest in how the police parse
the guilty from the guilty.55
To challenge how the police parse the guilty from the guilty, a
defendant must demonstrate that the police enforced a criminal law against
him because of his membership in a protected class, e.g., race.56 In order to
prevail on a “selective enforcement claim,” one must prove disparate
impact and intentional discrimination.57 “Disparate impact” means that
52

See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing
plaintiffs); ACLU OF N. CAL., THE CALIFORNIA DWB REPORT: A REPORT FROM THE
HIGHWAYS, TRENCHES AND HALLS OF POWER IN CALIFORNIA 15–40 (2002), available at
http://www.aclunc.org/library/publications/asset_upload_file305_3517.pdf
(detailing
individual profiling narratives); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 564–65 (1997) (describing the allegations in Complaint, Wilkins v. Md.
State Police, Civil No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1993)); David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270–75
(1999) (detailing the evidence of innocent, middle-class African-American victims of
profiling). By “successful,” I mean that such litigation has generated several settlement
agreements. See Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., In Landmark Racial Profiling Settlement,
Arizona Law Enforcement Agents Agree to Major Reforms (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/landmark-racial-profiling-settlement-arizona-lawenforcement-agents-agree-major-refor; Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., In Landmark Racial
Profiling Settlement, California Highway Patrol Agrees to Major Reforms (Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/in_landmark_racial_profiling_settlement,_
california_highway_patrol_agrees_to_major_reforms.shtml.
53
See Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1034–
35 (2002).
54
See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 119 (2007) (noting a study of traffic
stops that indicates a higher “hit rate” for white drivers than minority drivers).
55
See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 571, 593–94 (2003). Even where there is documented racial disparity in stop and
search rates, it does not necessarily follow that there is racial disparity in arrest rates.
Compare Bernard Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem?
2–3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 482, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474809 (summarizing profiling studies), with Jeffrey Fagan et al.,
An Analysis of the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias,
102 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 813, 815–16 (2007) (summarizing New York’s stop and frisk
study).
56
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
57
See id. (noting that selective enforcement claims are governed by “ordinary equal
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there is a universe of “similarly situated” offenders, i.e., offenders who are
not members of the protected group and against whom the police did not
enforce the criminal law at issue. For example, a minority motorist who
alleges selective enforcement of the speed limit would have to demonstrate
that law enforcement permitted white individuals to speed with impunity
while enforcing the speed limit against minority motorists. To succeed, the
minority challenger would also have to prove that the police intentionally
targeted minority motorists on account of their race. Proving racial animus
or “intent” is difficult.58 It is more difficult to establish a case of selective
enforcement than other kinds of discrimination because the Court has made
it difficult to even obtain discovery.59
The Supreme Court has held that, to obtain discovery for a selective
enforcement claim in a criminal case, a defendant must demonstrate that
“similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted,
but were not.”60 To satisfy the “similarly situated” requirement, courts have
required defendants to produce evidence of offenders who are virtually
identical to the defendant in every regard save for race.61 In United States
v. Barlow, for instance, the Seventh Circuit elided the requirement for
individualized suspicion with that for similarly situated offenders.62 Barlow
argued that federal agents targeted black passengers for investigation at
Chicago’s main train station. Rejecting his selective enforcement claim, the
Seventh Circuit stated that, to be similarly situated, white offenders would
have had to engage in the same microbehaviors (“i.e., looking nervously
over their shoulders”) that the arresting officers claimed drew their attention
to Barlow.63 Such a narrow interpretation of the similarly situated
requirement makes it virtually impossible to obtain discovery regarding, let
alone to challenge, how police officers weigh various factors in
distinguishing different categories of offenders. For example, a criminal
defendant might charge that the police more intensively enforce narcotics
laws in a particular neighborhood on account of race. There will, however,
protection standards”).
58
Id. at 463–64 (noting the standard for proving a claim is “demanding”).
59
In United States v. Armstrong, the Court held that defendants must show disparate
impact just to obtain discovery relating to their claim of selective enforcement. Id. at 465.
The Court made it clear that its purpose in so requiring was to make selective enforcement
claims more difficult. Id. at 464–66; see also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863–64
(2002) (per curiam) (noting that statistics showing blacks are charged with death-eligible
offenses more frequently than whites does not constitute evidence of disparate impact).
60
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468.
61
See United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Turner, 104 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 1997).
62
Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1012.
63
Id.
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always be a host of racial and non-racial differences that characterize
offender populations across geographic boundaries. The Ninth Circuit
foreclosed just such an inquiry in United States v. Turner.64 A selective
enforcement claim is viable only in the unlikely event that there is a white
offender virtually identical to the defendant who the arresting officer chose
not to target.65 As a practical matter, individual officers are rarely in such a
position.
Challenging police discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment is
most plausible under the Due Process Clause. So-called vagueness
challenges are rare, and the Court’s opinions further demonstrate the extent
to which it has organized criminal procedure around the individual officer–
citizen encounter.
The Court will declare a criminal statute void for vagueness if it is
insufficiently specific to apprise an ordinary person of the conduct that the
legislature has criminalized.66 That is to say that the vague statute does not
adequately distinguish guilty from innocent conduct and “entrusts
lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his
beat.”67 The Court has been particularly skeptical of anti-loitering-type
statutes because of fear that police enforce such laws against minorities and
political dissenters.68 The Court has used vagueness doctrine as a kind of
surrogate for equal protection: vagueness doctrine allows the Court to
control for prospective racial harms that excessive officer discretion may
engender without having to address race squarely.69
In its most recent opinion voiding for vagueness, the Court invalidated
a Chicago gang-loitering ordinance.70 The ordinance permitted law
enforcement to arrest suspected gang members for failing to disperse on
command.71 The Court rejected Chicago’s argument that departmental
64

See Turner, 104 F.3d at 1185 (noting that similarly situated white offenders would
have to be “gang members who sold large quantities of crack”); see also United States v.
Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232 (D. Kan. 2004) (explaining that, to be
similarly situated, white offenders had to display the same indicators of drug trafficking that
minority defendants did).
65
See United States v. Dixon, 486 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that to
qualify as similarly situated offenders must have been overlooked by the same officers that
arrested defendant).
66
See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
67
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 360 (1983)).
68
See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163.
69
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 647 (1997).
70
Morales, 527 U.S. at 51.
71
Id. at 47.

2012]

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICING

1185

regulations restricting enforcement sufficed to control individual officer
discretion.72 Instead, choices about where and how to enforce accounted for
the high number of minority arrests pursuant to the ordinance.73
Nonetheless, the opinion casts the “discretion problem” as one of individual
officers haphazardly enforcing an ordinance that fails to adequately
distinguish the innocent from the guilty. However, as noted by Debra
Livingston in detail,74 even narrowly drafted criminal laws permit
considerable officer discretion, particularly when considered as an entire
body of law.75 Morales is deeply flawed because it assumes both the
primacy of individual officer discretion in generating racial harm and that
statutory language has the unmediated capacity to constrain police
discretion. Neither is true.
III. DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION
Scholars have documented that minorities and the poor are more likely
to be arrested and incarcerated than non-minorities and the middle class.76
This Section demonstrates that such disparities are not the simple
consequence of law-breaking patterns or individual officers’ biases.77 How
arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction is not the aggregate effect of

72

Id. at 62–64.
See infra Part III.B.2.ii.
74
Livingston, supra note 69, at 616–17, 629, 650.
75
See infra notes 142–159 and accompanying text. Ironically, Professor Livingston
argues that the answer to excessive discretion in the order-maintenance context is to pass
more criminal laws authorizing order maintenance. See Livingston, supra note 69, at 560,
626, 635–36.
76
See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 5, at 67, 104, 112–13.
77
Criminology tends to suggest that “attitudinal factors,” such as racial animus, do not
play a significant role in explaining how patrol officers exercise their arrest authority. See
Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During
Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 426 (2005) (concluding that race predicts how officers
form suspicions, but not how they make arrest decisions); Allison T. Chappell et al., The
Organizational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 302
(2006) (concluding that situational determinants are more important than structural ones);
Robert E. Worden, Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police Behavior: A
Theoretical Reappraisal and Empirical Assessment, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 702 (1989)
(noting empirical studies that suggest officers’ attitudes do not inform their arrest
decisionmaking). Rather, “situational factors” go much farther in explaining officer choices.
See Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on
Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 246–47 (1984) (discussing how
class issues and the tendency of police to attach pejorative traits to minority suspects may
contribute to racial disparities in arrests); see also Scott W. Phillips & Sean P. Varano,
Police Criminal Charging Decisions: An Examination of Post-Arrest Decision Making, 36 J.
CRIM. JUST. 307, 308 (2008) (summarizing previous research on situational factors and arrest
decisions).
73
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individual officers’ discretionary decisions. Rather, it is departmental
choiceschoices made by policymakers and administratorsthat
determine how arrests are distributed. This picture of departmental
discretion suggests that many categories of arrests should be conceived as
distributive phenomena. Departmental choices create benefits and burdens
for individuals and communities. Accordingly, police departments should
calibrate those choices to achieve egalitarian results. That discussion is
taken up in Part IV.
Subsection A below shows how, in the proactive policing context,
departmental policies regarding geographic deployment, enforcement
priority, and enforcement tactics determine how the benefits and burdens of
policing are distributed. Modern policing relies heavily on arrests as a
crime-control strategy. That strategy, coupled with the dramatic expansion
of mala prohibita offenses, has conferred enormous discretion upon police
departments to decide when, where, and by what means (if at all) to enforce
criminal laws. Subsection B illustrates how departmental discretion drives
inequality in the narcotics and quality-of-life contexts.
A. DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION AND PROACTIVE POLICING

The proactive policing model relies on departmental decisionmakers’
discretion—i.e., the discretion of policymakers and administrators above
the individual officer level—to determine how arrests are distributed across
a jurisdiction and, by extension, arrestees’ demographic profile. In
proactive policing, the police themselves must generate knowledge and
enforcement priorities regarding crime. This model is in contrast to
“reactive” policing, where the police respond to specific reports of criminal
misconduct, typically made by victims or witnesses.
“Vice,” public nuisance, and traffic crimes are examples of proactive
policing. These crimes do not typically involve a particularized victim.
Some related crimes, such as drunk driving, are distinct from vice and
minor crimes because they create inordinate risk of generating a
particularized victim. In stark contrast, the victims of vice crimes are often
complicit in or responsible for the criminalized activity, as in the hapless
drug addict who might be cast as a “victim” of narcotics trafficking.
Victims of vice crimes may also be members of a community who are
exposed to illicit activity’s secondary consequences, such as increased
property crimes associated with narcotics or the aesthetic harms associated
with graffiti.78 But, such “victims” are not particularized in the same way
78

Some would suggest that “community policing” is the best way to address the needs of
such victims. In theory, community policing “seeks to address the causes of crime and
reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving strategies and police-
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as is typically true in reactive policing.79 This distinction matters because
arrest disparity for victim-initiated crimes has remained relatively stable
since the 1970s.80 Proactive policing, particularly narcotics enforcement,
accounts for the massive increases in minority incarceration rates since the
1970s.81 In the proactive policing context, departmental discretion shapes
arrest outcomes.82
Departmental discretion operates in three related dimensions:
geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics.
Geographic deployment refers to where in a jurisdiction officers are
deployed.
Urban police departments are typically segmented into
precincts.83 Patrol officers are typically assigned not only to a particular
precinct, but to details that have specified geographic boundaries.84
Specialized units may also be assigned to particular precincts. This, for
example, would likely be true for undercover units focusing on small-scale
narcotics transactions or other minor crimes.85 Given the entrenched
patterns of economic and racial segregation in most American cities,86
community partnerships.” See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMMUNITY POLICING IN LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1997 AND 1999,
at 1 (rev. 2003). In practice, however, there is considerable variation and debate as to what
community policing means. See Edward R. Maguire & Charles M. Katz, Community
Policing, Loose Coupling, and Sensemaking in American Police Agencies, 19 JUST. Q. 503,
510–11 (2002). While many departments report that they are engaged in “community
policing,” this claim may only be loosely related to what the department is actually doing.
See id. at 530. Federal grant-reporting requirements may also have created incentives for
departments to report that they are doing community policing when they are not. See id.
79
“Victim” as a social category is, in part, constituted through state action. “Harm” and
“victims” seem to be ever widening social categories. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION
OF ORDER 212 (2001); see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 75–110
(2007).
80
TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13 (explaining that the war on drugs, not violent crime
rates, accounts for dramatic increases in the black incarceration rate).
81
Id. at 4, 6 (arguing that federal policymakers in the Reagan and Bush administrations
knew racial disparity would result from the federal “war on drugs”); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL 132 (2001).
82
Cf. WILSON, supra note 12, at 86, 100 (arguing that departmental discretion has a
marked impact on policing vice and minor crimes).
83
For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) is divided into numerous
precincts. See Precincts, NYPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/precincts.shtml
(last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
84
EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 4 (2004).
85
Id. at 149 (noting that anti-crime teams that focus on street-level narcotics operate at
the precinct level in the NYPD); Tal Klement & Elizabeth Siggins, A Window of
Opportunity: Addressing The Complexities of the Relationship Between Drug Enforcement
and Racial Disparity in Seattle, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 165, 193 (2003) (noting the same for
Seattle).
86
See LAMBERTH, supra note 6, at 57; Capers, supra note 31, at 47.

1188

NIREJ S. SEKHON

[Vol. 101

different precincts will often encompass populations with different
demographic profiles.87 How police departments distribute police officers
among and within precincts will play a significant role in determining the
demographic profile of arrestees. This does not simply mean that arrestees
will be “whiter” in whiter precincts (or more minority in minority
precincts).88 Officers may be deployed inordinately in a white precinct
because its residents have political clout and believe that minorities are
largely responsible for crime in the precinct.89 But the mere presence of
police officers in a particular place does not, by itself, mean that there will
be arrests at all, let alone minority arrests.90
Departmental decisions regarding enforcement priority will determine
what kinds of crimes (if any) officers in a particular location will
concentrate on. The range of criminalized conduct is vast.91 It is, therefore,
common for police to systematically overlook an entire range of crimes,
particularly minor, malum in se ones.92 It may well be that a particular
community’s mores permit certain forms of criminalized misconduct.93 If
such conduct is also viewed as unimportant by the police department,
officers will have little incentive to enforce against it.94 A departmental
decision to begin enforcing against erstwhile unenforced, minor crimes will
have a significant effect on individual officers’ behavior.95 This has proven
particularly true where a department’s choices are part of a wider policy
program to interdict “disorderly” behavior under the rubric of “quality-oflife” policing.96 Another common example is in the narcotics context:
departments may elect to focus on particular narcotics over others for a host

87

See, e.g., Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195–98, 249 nn.39, 42, 45 & 48
(describing demographic profiles of the Seattle Police Department’s four precincts).
88
See id. at 197–98, 249 n.48 (noting that 60% of those arrested in Seattle’s West
Precinct for a drug violation were non-white even though the vast majority of residents in the
precinct are white).
89
Id. at 205.
90
See, e.g., Kimberly D. Hassell, Variations in Police Patrol Practices, 30 POLICING
257, 268 (2007) (noting that policing tactics may vary considerably among precincts in one
police department).
91
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing “overcriminalization”).
92
While rarely memorialized in official policy, selective non-enforcement of the
criminal code is a long-recognized fact of policing. See supra notes 12–18 and
accompanying text.
93
See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS 79, 359–60 (2006) (noting that
residents of some inner city communities accept “backroom negotiation” between police and
gang leaders that would not be tolerated in middle-class communities).
94
See id. at 359.
95
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 100.
96
See infra Part III.B.2.i (discussing a quality-of-life policing case study).
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of reasons, or none at all.97
Departmental decisions regarding enforcement priority are tightly
braided with decisions about enforcement tactics. The former determines
what misconduct to focus upon while the latter determines how to focus
upon it. Making arrests is, in and of itself, a significant tactical choice.
Police departments have a host of other tactics available, and maintaining a
uniform police presence in a park may better deter homeless people from
sleeping there than does arresting the occasional sleeper. A department
might elect to increase arrest rates for particular kinds of conduct in
different ways. For example, a department might incentivize patrol officers
to make more arrests than they ordinarily would.98 Patrol represents the
largest portion of a department’s sworn force.99 Typically, patrol officers
tend towards leniency and make fewer arrests than they have opportunities
to make.100 A departmental decision requiring patrol officers to make
arrests can very quickly change that, as occurred in New York City when it
adopted a version of “broken windows” policing in the 1990s.101
Departments may also create (or enlarge) specialized, arrest-intensive units
for particular categories of offenses. For example, undercover units that
focus on street crimes will generate significantly more arrests per officer
than does patrol.102 Choices about whether to carry out one kind of
operation or another will also have consequences for the volume and nature
of arrests. For example, buy-bust operations targeting street-level narcotics
transactions are likely to yield more arrests (but less contraband) over time
than warrant-based operations targeting indoor transactions.103
The specific processes by which the three modes of departmental
discretion operate are often opaque. Take a department’s decision to
97

See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing a narcotics enforcement case study).
See, e.g., Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 199. This may be why patrol officers
are typically the subject of observational criminological studies. See, e.g., Alpert et al.,
supra note 77, at 426; Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity & Discretionary Justice: Race and
Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 239 (1984).
99
See DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 14 (2000) (discussing a study that found patrol officers spend less than 15% of onduty time fighting crime); see also CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (“On patrol, [officers]
dealt with the fluid whole of peoples’ lives,” not just “criminals.”). Even calls for service
tend not to be arrest-intensive. See David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to
Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 44, 49–
51, 57 (2009).
100
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49.
101
See infra Part III.B.2.i.
102
See, e.g., CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (comparing the author’s work on a streetcrimes unit to that he did while on patrol).
103
See, e.g., Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding
Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122–23 (2006).
98
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generate more arrests through its patrol unit.104 To the extent that patrol
officers are directed to make more arrests, it is often unclear as to how that
mandate is transmitted. Police departments are loath to admit that officers
have “arrest quotas.” But, it periodically emerges that a particular
department has quotas (or the functional equivalent thereof).105 Sometimes
it is possible to ascertain how senior department personnel make choices
about officer deployment and enforcement priority,106 but that is rare. A
host of budget and personnel decisions might account for why one precinct
has more undercover street-crimes officers than another.107
Neither politics nor law compels police departments to be transparent
about how they exercise discretion. The history of modern policing
suggests why this is true. Bureaucratization and political insulation are the
modern police department’s birth traits.108 Rationalized by a new “crime
control” ethos in the mid-twentieth century,109 the institutional shifts that
gave rise to the modern police department generated new capacity for the
kinds of choices described above. Bureaucratization and political insulation
also deepened departments’ commitment to using arrests to achieve crime
control while a steadily expanding criminal code increased the opportunities
104

See infra Part III.B.2.i (discussing quality-of-life policing).
See Alice Gendar, NYPD Captain Allegedly Caught in Arrest Quota Fixing, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
ny_crime/2007/11/14/2007-11-14_nypd_captain_allegedly_caught_in_arrest_-1.html; Jim
Hoffer, N.Y.P.D. Officers Under “Quota” Pressure, WABC (March 3, 2010),
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/investigators&id=7307336; John Marzulli,
We Fabricated Drug Charges Against Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quotas, Former
Detective Testifies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/201110-13/news/30291567_1_nypd-narcotics-detective-false-arrest-suit-henry-tavarez; Graham
Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 2010, at
12; see also Michael Murray, Why Arrest Quotas Are Wrong, POLICEMAN’S BENEVOLENT
ASSOC. MAG. (Spring 2005), available at http://www.nycpba.org/publications/mag-05spring/murray.html.
106
See infra Part III.B.2.ii.
107
See infra Part III.B.2.i. Even those criminologists that study departments’
organizational structure offer few clues as to how departmental decisions are made. See
generally EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLICE
AGENCIES 31, 76, 90, 99 (2003) (hypothesizing as to why different departments have
different structures).
108
See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 35–36; but see John P. Crank & Robert Langworthy,
An Institutional Perspective of Policing, 83 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 338, 342 (1992)
(explaining that “legitimacy” is best understood in terms of police departments’ relationship
with other powerful actors whose decisions affect the continued flow of resources to the
department).
109
“Crime control” here is intended as a narrative about police purpose that police
departments project and in which there is widespread belief. John P. Crank, Institutional
Theory of the Police: A Review of the State of the Art, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES MGMT. 186, 189, 194 (2003) (referring to such narratives as mythologies).
105
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for doing so.
1. Bureaucratization and Political Insulation
Modern police departments are hierarchical, command-and-control
institutions that rely heavily on arrests in order to demonstrate their
effectiveness. Paradoxically, in the proactive policing context, arrests often
serve as measures for both crime-control exigency and crime-control
success.110
The modern, urban police department took form in the mid-twentieth
century. Its birth history is well documented, so only a caption version is
provided here.111 Well into the twentieth century, urban police departments
were cogs in urban machine politics.112 Police departments were prime
sources of patronage jobs.113 The beat cop was as much a sub-local
functionary for the political machine as he was a watchman ensuring some
measure of order on his beat.114 He enjoyed substantial discretion to
enforce or not enforce the criminal code as necessary to maintain a level of
order consistent with community mores. Depending on the neighborhood,
this frequently entailed permitting a fair amount of criminal misconduct. 115
As political functionary, the beat cop was the political machine’s agent,
gathering and dispensing information for his own benefit and the machine’s
sustenance.116 The beat cop had a granular knowledge of the landscape and
those who populated it. And arrests were not the preferred, let alone
mandated, technique for controlling crime.117
Corruption was an endemic feature of watchman-style policing and
was among the most salient rallying cries for reformers in the twentieth

110
See Harcourt, supra note 55, at 18 (quoting the former New Jersey attorney general);
TONRY, supra note 5, at 106.
111
See, e.g., BARLOW & BARLOW, supra note 99, at 19–46; SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at
31–36.
112
See BARLOW & BARLOW, supra note 99, at 31.
113
See id.
114
See ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME 27 (1999) (describing the NYPD in
early twentieth century); WILSON, supra note 12, at 31–32; see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–50 (1993) (describing
policing in the nineteenth century).
115
See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 27. This dynamic still prevails in poor, urban
communities. See VENKATESH, supra note 93, at 7–8, 200–04 (arguing that police do not
enforce law to the hilt when community mores do not permit it); Natapoff, supra note 35, at
1747.
116
See LUC SANTE, LOW LIFE 237–43 (1991) (describing NYPD in the nineteenth
century).
117
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49.
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century.118 The structure of big-city politics in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries encouraged police officers to disregard crime for a
price.119 This was in grave misstep with Americans’ increasing anxieties
about crime and cities during the post-war period.120 It was in that vein that
the first wave of discretion scholars focused on big-city beat cops.121
Professor Sklansky has persuasively argued that police reform in the midtwentieth century resonated with a new ethos of post-war, American
democracy: “pluralism.” Pluralist democracy checked the potential danger
of populist fanaticism by insulating technocratic decisionmaking
apparatuses from mass politics.122
The chief mandate for reformed police departments was “crime
control.” And Chief William Parker’s Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) in the 1950s was a progenitor of the new model for urban police
departments: a crime-control technocracy.123 Rigidly hierarchical, it relied
on centralized command for its squad-car-bound force. The LAPD’s
leadership, as would be true of the “reformed” police departments in other
big cities, enjoyed considerable autonomy from elected office holders.124
This arrangement continues to define police departments in many big,
American cities.125 This is not to say that modern police departments
118

See SANTE, supra note 116, at 240 (describing bribery in the NYPD); see also
GARLAND, supra note 81, at 114–15 (describing police “professionalization”); SKLANSKY,
supra note 19, at 35–36 (discussing the Wickersham Commission and reform movement).
119
See MIKE ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 107–13 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing corruption in Chicago); SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 27–28 (describing
corruption in New York City).
120
See GARLAND, supra note 81, 152–54; SIMON, supra note 79, at 90–93; Stuntz, supra
note 33, at 2000–05 (discussing “white flight” from cities and fear of crime).
121
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 11, at 41 (discussing the Chicago Police Department).
122
SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 34–38.
123
See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 36; see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 250–51
(2d ed. 2006).
124
See id. at 36–37.
125
Most police departments are controlled at the municipal level. See MATTHEW J.
HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT
1 (2003). And in the largest American cities, police chiefs are appointed, not elected. See
Pelpia Trip, More Information on Dallas Police Chief David Kunkle, CW33 NEWS (Nov. 11,
2009), http://www.the33tv.com/news/kdaf-dallas-police-chief-david-kunkle-story,0,5569866
.story; Letter from Frank Fairbanks, Phoenix City Manager, to Jack Harris, Chief of Phoenix
Police Dep’t (May 5, 2009), available at http://www.phoenix.gov/police/public_safety_
manager_duties.pdf; Press Release, City of Houston, Mayor Bill White Announces Police
Chief Nominee (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.houstontx.gov/mayor/
press/20040227.html; Press Release, City of San Jose, National Search for Police Chief Ends
in San Jose (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/cityManager/releases/
2004-01-06_policechief.pdf; CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MANAGER’S REPORT, No. 03-164 (July 25,
2003), available at http://docs.sandiego.gov/reportstocouncil/2003/03-164.pdf; Office of the
Chief, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO POLICE, http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/office.asp#LEGAL
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operate without political constraint.126 In order for senior personnel to
maintain their positions and for the department to maximize its funding
stream, it must demonstrate that it is advancing crime control. The
audiences for such demonstrations of legitimacy are typically other
institutional actors,127 although it might on occasion be the general public—
especially when a heinous crime captures public attention or when there is a
generalized sense that crime is “out of control.” In the latter case, creating
the impression that a department is controlling crime need not mean that it
is actually doing so.128 Similarly, making arrests need not mean that a
police department is actually reducing crime.129
Arrest is not only a key instrument in the modern police department’s
crime-control arsenal, it is an emblem of whether a police department is
satisfying its crime-control mandate. Influenced by Fordist theories of
industrial efficiency and postwar anxiety about popular democracy,130 the
new policing ethos abstracted crime control from the life of any particular
neighborhood. The new ethos engendered what has become a broadly
shared sense that making arrests is, itself, tantamount to crime control.131
That arrests have this symbolic significance flows from the premium
modern policing places on both crime control and measurability. Arrests,

(last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Office of the Chief of Police, LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/
inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/834 (last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Profile of Charles
Ramsey, PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, www.phillypolice.com/about/leadership/charles-h-ramsey/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Profile of Raymond W. Kelly, NYPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
nypd/html/administration/headquarters_co.shtml
(last
visited
Sept.
27,
2011);
Superintendent’s Office, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/
portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Bureaus/Superintendent%27s%20Office (last visited Sept.
27, 2011).
126
See, e.g., Crank & Langworthy, supra note 108, at 342.
127
See id. (describing these actors as “sovereigns”).
128
See Crank, supra note 109, at 194 (summarizing research on the creation of
specialized gang units).
129
HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 122–25 (explaining that whether racial targeting
decreases crime depends on the relative elasticity of different groups to policing).
130
See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 26.
131
See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 113, 139 (noting that academics have modeled
police “success” in narcotics interdiction context by “hit rate,” which is the identification of
an arrestable offense). This view is not universal. At least some argue that the “community
policing” movement expressly questions this view and centralization more generally. See
KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 158, 165 (advocating for community policing that
entails greater officer discretion vis-à-vis the police department). Community policing was
supposed to deemphasize arrests in favor of community engagement and more holistic
approaches to community problem solving. See id. In practice, though, many police
departments have enacted “community policing” in a top-down fashion that is a hallmark of
a centralized police bureaucracy. See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 17.
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like certain kinds of crime, are readily measurable.132 Some crime is
parsed, catalogued, and studied by severity and distribution.133 The kinds of
crimes that most readily lend to measurement, however, are the same
victim- or witness-reported crimes that reactive policing is organized
around. The preeminent measure of unreported crime in the United States
is the Department of Justice’s Crime Victims’ Survey. 134 As the title
suggests, the DOJ conducts a telephonic survey designed to estimate how
many victims there are of certain enumerated crimes. The survey does not
include the vice or minor crimes that proactive policing is typically
concerned with.135 On the other hand, the Uniform Crime Reports, which
tabulate arrests, do include data for vice or minor crimes.136
Arrests play a contradictory and circular role in proactive policing.
They are often held out both as proof of the need for crime control and as
evidence of police enforcement’s efficacy.137 This contradiction is apparent
with narcotics enforcement, where a high minority-arrest rate is used to
show that the minority-offense rate is high.138 Even the Supreme Court has
indulged in this circularity.139 The self-reinforcing nature of arrest rates in
the proactive policing context likely entrenches the institutional
arrangements that reproduce racial disparity.
For example, take
specialization. Modern, urban police departments tend to have a range of
specialized units for narcotics, gangs, street crimes, domestic violence, and
132

See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 124.
Data is a hallmark of modern policing; the federal Uniform Crime Records came into
existence after World War II. Compstat may represent the culmination of this process. See
GARLAND, supra note 81, at 115 (discussing “computerization” and the use of the
information technology in the 1980s and 1990s). Compstat is a data-driven application that
allows police departments to track the geographic distribution of criminal incidents and
complaints. See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 103–04. The NYPD pioneered Compstat in
the 1990s and it has subsequently spread to numerous other urban law enforcement agencies.
Id. at 123–24. But see William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting that precinct commanders and
administrators manipulated Compstat data to favorably impact crime rate statistics for their
precinct); but cf. Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Idle Comstat Meetings, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9,
2010),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-04-09/news/bal-md.ci.comstat08apr09_1_
comstat-police-department-s-operations-anthony-guglielmi (reporting on Baltimore Police
Department’s suspensions of Compstat use due to the “staff friction” it caused).
134
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATION’S TWO CRIME MEASURES (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ntcm.pdf.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Harcourt, supra note 55, at 18. It is not state officials that are the only ones
responsible for engaging in such circularity. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, U.S. Cites 175 Arrests of
Traffickers in Drug Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A15.
138
See TONRY, supra note 5, at 106.
139
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1996).
133
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drunk driving. Arrest and specialization dovetail in that specialized units
are often arrest-intensive.140 Once created, a specialized unit will tend to
generate arrests and intelligence that reinforce its very existence. If
specialized undercover narcotics units are concentrated in minority
neighborhoods, those units will generate arrests and intelligence regarding
minority narcotics activity. This may create the impression that minorities
inordinately engage in narcotics activity, which, in turn, may impel even
more minority arrests.141
It is in the proactive policing context that police departments have the
greatest discretion in shaping demographic outcomes. This is not just
because of modern police departments’ institutional structure, but because
legislatures have generated a vast range of opportunities for police
departments to make such choices.
2. Expansive Enforcement Opportunity
Legislatures have created virtually bottomless pools of prospective
offenders by creating evermore mala prohibita offenses. Doing so has
amplified departmental discretion.
Federal and state criminal codes achieved binding-busting girth in the
twentieth century. In most jurisdictions, the number of crimes increased
twofold, if not substantially more.142 Some of the growth is attributable to
the need (or perceived need) to regulate new, modern behaviors such as
vehicular crimes and identity theft. But legislatures have also demonstrated
remarkable capacity for proliferating redundant crimes.143 Legal scholars
have criticized the phenomenon, referring to it as “overcriminalization.”144
The term captures both the sheer number of crimes and the vast swaths of
behavior those crimes encompass. And much of that behavior is not malum
in se, as in paradigmatic crimes such as murder, robbery, and the like. For
example, narcotics convictions account for most of the dramatic increase in
140

See, e.g., CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (contrasting drug details with patrols);
HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE 20 (2008)
(stating that one-half of marijuana arrests in New York are made by specialized units);
Jennifer R. Wynn, Can Zero Tolerance Last? Voices From Inside the Precinct, in ZERO
TOLERANCE 107, 112 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (noting that a small
number of officers made the most arrests in NYPD). But cf. Fagan et. al., supra note 55, at
815–16, 820 (noting that stops tend not to produce arrests).
141
See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 149 (discussing “ratchet effect”).
142
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 514–15 (2001) (describing state and federal criminal codes).
143
See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515,
527–28 (2000) (describing the numerous incarnations of assault and larceny in California).
144
See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
713 & n.49 (2005) (citing numerous criticisms of the phenomenon).
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incarceration rates in the United States since the 1970s.145
Overcriminalization increases opportunities for enforcement (and nonenforcement) of the criminal code.
Overcriminalization adds an
exclamation point to the long-acknowledged fact that complete enforcement
of the criminal code is chimerical.146 This is readily apparent with vice
crimes. Take narcotics distribution: at any given moment there are far more
individuals engaged in narcotics distribution than law enforcement can
possibly apprehend. The facial homogeneity of “narcotics distribution” as
codified147 is belied by the diversity of behaviors to which it applies. It
applies in equal measure to the suburbanite who sells cocaine out of his
home for cash, the club-goer who gives ecstasy tabs to his friends in
exchange for drinks, and the chronically homeless addict who sells crack on
the street in kind. Each of these examples, technically, constitutes the same
criminal offense: narcotics distribution. Legislatures, however, rarely
provide any guidance to police departments on how to prioritize amongst
different offenders.148
Bloated criminal codes create a set of opportunities to indirectly
address social problems, which are not criminalized per se. These
opportunities exist in three dimensions. The surfeit of criminal laws allows
police departments to arrest individuals (1) whose behavior is perceived as
troublesome, but is not directly criminalized, e.g., in the 1990s, the NYPD
aggressively used pedestrian and traffic obstruction laws against
panhandlers, an activity that was not directly criminalized;149 (2) who are
likely to engage in more serious criminalized behaviors in the future, e.g.,
avoiding the collateral, violent crimes associated with narcotics is often
proffered as justification for aggressively enforcing narcotics laws;150 and
145
See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 132; see also TONRY, supra note 5, at 49 (discussing
the racial disparities in arrest and incarceration rates, which are particularly pronounced for
drug offenses).
146
See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
147
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 2000).
148
See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 529–33 (describing incentives that lead legislators to
define crimes broadly and leave it to police and prosecutors to exercise enforcement
discretion). Mandatory arrest laws in the domestic violence context are the rare exception.
Weisburd & Eck, supra note 99, at 51.
149
Tanya Erzen, Turnstile Jumpers and Broken Windows: Policing Disorder in New
York City app, in ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 140, at 19, 35–36 (quoting sections from the
NYPD Quality of Life Enforcement Options Reference Guide); HARCOURT, supra note 79, at
40, 102, 128 (2001) (recounting when New York City tried to criminalize panhandling, but
the ordinance was deemed an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment).
150
See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 211; see also HARCOURT, supra note 79, at
40, 102, 128 (expounding an analogous rationale for arresting aggressive panhandlers in
New York City); Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot, but Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2009, at A24.
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(3) who have likely engaged in serious criminal activity that cannot be
readily proved, e.g., charging Al Capone with tax evasion.151
Legislators have every incentive to leave it to prosecutors and police to
liberally exercise their discretion not to enforce the criminal code.152 And
courts are almost completely agnostic as to how they go about it.153
Professor Stuntz has persuasively argued that it is full enforcement’s
impossibility that enables relentless passage of new criminal laws.154
Taking a hard-line stance on crime defines political orthodoxy for both the
left and right in the United States.155 Passing a criminal law is the most
visible way for legislators to substantiate their commitment to protecting
the public, and the impossibility of full enforcement insulates legislators
from the risk that new criminal laws will be politically unpalatable to large
swaths of middle-class voters.156 According to Professor Stuntz, “criminal
law” is no longer even law per se, but just a “veil” for the distribution of
discretionary power to punish.157
It is ironic that overcriminalization has amplified law enforcement’s
discretionary authority because it is the public’s distrust of discretion that
has animated the increasing sweep and severity of legislatures’ criminal
enactments. However, the most demonized forms of discretion have been
those that the public imagines as introducing leniency into the system. 158
Departmental discretion is not imagined in such terms.159
151

See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2019–20 (describing the Boston Police Department’s use
of narcotics laws to arrest gang members believed to have been responsible for substantial
violent crime).
152
See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 575–77.
153
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (“[W]e are aware of no
principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive
and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the
lawfulness of enforcement.”).
154
See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 575–77 (noting that strict federal sentencing guidelines
emblematize hostility towards judicial discretion).
155
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 79, at 59, 75, 102 (describing America’s increasing
punitiveness as driving from the political left and right); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2008–10
(same). Even liberal Democrats must declaim their commitment to aggressively expanding
and enforcing criminal law. SIMON, supra note 79, at 49–52, 58–59 (describing Presidents
Kennedy’s, Johnson’s, and Clinton’s uses of crime as a political issue).
156
Stuntz, supra note 142, at 528, 532–33. Most legislators have no interest in
compelling enforcement of those portions of the code criminalizing “marginal middle-class
behavior.” Id. at 509; see also id. at 516–17 (listing examples of statutes criminalizing
trifling conduct).
157
Id. at 599.
158
SIMON, supra note 79, at 165. Judicial discretion in sentencing is a prime example of
this phenomenon. See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 59–61.
159
See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 132 (describing increased punitiveness); LaFave,
supra note 18, at 215 (describing the invisibility of police discretion).
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B. PROACTIVE POLICING CASE STUDIES

Police departments enjoy considerable, unchecked authority to make
policy as to how criminal laws are enforced. Racial disparity in narcotics
and quality-of-life enforcement illustrate how departmental discretion can
generate inegalitarian consequences.
The racial disparity in proactive policing arrests cannot, prima facie, be
defended in terms of “colorblindness.” Scholars acknowledge that
proactive policing has driven racial disparity.160 Both proactive policing
and reactive policing generate arrest disparity, but the latter is less troubling
because victims play a substantial role in accounting for offenders’
demographic profile.161 In an ideal world, arrestee demographics would
perfectly mirror offender demographics.
A racial group’s
overrepresentation amongst offenders would perfectly account for its
overrepresentation amongst arrestees.162 To the extent that crimes of
violence are often intraracial,163 doing justice by minority victims should
mean a higher arrest rate for minority suspects.164 Unfortunately, white
crime victims inspire greater sympathy from individual police officers and
police departments.165 All of this suggests that arrest disparity for victimreported crimes might even be higher without inspiring serious equality
concerns.166 The same is not true in the proactive context.
Arrest disparity in proactive policing is not readily explicable in terms
of minority offense rates.167 The case studies that follow illustrate how
160
TONRY, supra note 5, at 4, 6, 67 (arguing that differential arrest rate drives differential
incarceration rate); Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 109; William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 834–35 (2006).
161
Colorblindness is a fair metaphor for describing the police’s enforcement priorities in
the reactive context if: (1) individuals across demographic categories consistently alert the
police to victimization and (2) the police consistently and symmetrically responded to
victim-reported crimes. Neither one of these is completely true. There is a gap between
reported crime and actual crime. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 134.
162
This is a false ideal to the extent that entrenched patterns of economic and social
marginalization engender violence and other criminal misconduct. See, e.g., THE NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 28, at 266–74.
163
See, e.g., ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BLACK VICTIMS OF
VIOLENT CRIME 5 (2007).
164
See Terrance J. Taylor et al., Racial Bias in Case Processing: Does Victim Race
Affect Police Clearance of Violent Crime Incidents?, 26 JUST. Q. 562, 583 (2009) (noting the
modestly lower violent-crime-clearance rate for black-on-black crime).
165
See Smith et al., supra note 77, at 248; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME,
AND THE LAW 76–135 (1997) (detailing the history of unequal enforcement).
166
See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
53, 87 (2003) (arguing that equal protection should oblige police to provide equal security
from law breakers).
167
See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
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deployment decisions, enforcement priorities, and enforcement tactics yield
dramatic racial disparity.
1. Narcotics Enforcement
Departmental
decisions
regarding
geographic
deployment,
enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics have led the Seattle Police
Department (SPD) to arrest an inordinately high number of black offenders.
In particular, the SPD’s use of arrest-intensive, buy-bust operations in
downtown Seattle targeting crack cocaine transactions yielded a blackarrest rate that far exceeds black participation in unlawful narcotics
transactions. I focus on Seattle because there is more information about the
demographic profile of offenders and police department decisionmaking
there than for other cities.168
Narcotics convictions in Seattle, like most other places in the United
States, have accounted for a dramatic spike in the incarceration of poor
people of color since the 1970s.169 Professor Tonry has argued that the
racial disparity engendered by the war on drugs is the direct consequence of
differential arrest rates.170 That is to say that police practices, not
prosecutorial or judicial discrimination, tend to account for increases in
minority incarceration.171 Police, who make arrests, determine the pool of
offenders that generate indictments and convictions. Typically, it is
difficult to find quantitative proof for the claim that narcotics arrests yield
unjustifiable racial disparity. This is for two reasons: (1) it is difficult to
construct a demographic profile of the offender population, because

Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 323
(2004); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2022 (noting that it is politically easier to enforce laws
against poor minority communities); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race,
Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 812–14 (1999) (arguing that the social distinction between “law-abiding”
and “lawless” is racialized).
168
See generally Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the
Question of Race: Lessons From Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419 (2005); Beckett et al., supra
note 103; Klement & Siggins, supra note 85. Information is available on narcotics
enforcement practices in Seattle in part because of litigation challenging racial disparity and
the SPD’s narcotics enforcement practices. See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL
353314 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2005). I helped represent the defendants in that litigation
for a brief period.
169
See TONRY, supra note 5, at 4, 6, 112; Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 177–78,
191 (noting minority overrepresentation amongst narcotics arrestees in 1999 and a
proportional increase in drug arrests in comparison to total arrests throughout 1990s).
170
TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13.
171
Id. at 51, 74; see also WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF
RACE & ETHNICITY ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING PROCESSES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IN
THREE COUNTIES OF WASHINGTON STATE 43 (1999).
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narcotics offenders are not likely to offer themselves up for demographers
to count, and (2) there is little information on how and why police organize
their enforcement priorities and tactics.172
African-Americans are dramatically overrepresented amongst those
arrested for narcotics offenses in Seattle. From January 1999 until April
2001, 64.2% of those arrested for narcotics delivery in Seattle were
African-American.173 During that period, African-Americans constituted
only 8.4% of Seattle’s population and were also a minority amongst
Seattle’s drug users and sellers.174 Public health data, in conjunction with
ethnographic and survey data, tends to suggest that drug sellers are white in
roughly the same proportion as drug users in Seattle.175 Seattle’s drugusing and drug-selling populations are significantly whiter than in most
other American cities.176 This is unsurprising given that Seattle’s general
population is more white than most other American cities.177 Seattle also is
reputed for its heroin problem, and the demographic profile of heroin users
in Seattle is overwhelmingly white.178 The same is, by and large, true for
other narcotics.179 African-Americans are, however, overrepresented
among crack users and sellers,180 but whites still represent approximately
half of all crack users in Seattle.181 This is to say that the demographic
profile of drug users in Seattle is largely white. The same holds true for
drug sellers.182 This is consistent with national trends and crack’s appeal to
poor people.183 There is little to suggest that crack use represents a
172

See TONRY, supra note 5, at 107 (noting that evidence regarding policing practices
tends to be anecdotal).
173
Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 118 (reporting on data collected for
methamphetamine, heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and ecstasy because these drugs
are treated comparably for punishment purposes). African-Americans are comparably
overrepresented amongst those arrested for drug possession. See Beckett et al., supra note
168, at 427.
174
Id. at 426.
175
Compare Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 119, with Beckett et al., supra note 168, at
427.
176
Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 424, 427.
177
Id. (stating that 70.1% of Seattle residents are white).
178
Id. at 424, 426.
179
Id. at 427.
180
See Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 119.
181
Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 427.
182
This is not to say that “drug sellers” and “drug buyers” are separate and discrete
communities.
183
On average, Seattle’s blacks are significantly poorer than its whites. See Office of the
Exec., Per Capita Income in King County by Race/Ethnicity, As a Percent of County
Average (2009), KING COUNTY (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.kingcounty.gov/
exec/PSB/BenchmarkProgram/Economy/EC02_Income/PerCapitaIncomeRaceChart.aspx
(reporting that per capita income of the county’s white residents is more than twice that of its
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particularly serious public safety problem in Seattle in relation to other
narcotics, particularly heroin.184 Nonetheless, the Seattle Police Department
focuses its enforcement energies on crack transactions, and that focus, in
turn, drives the stark racial disparity in its arrest rates.
Institutional discretion substantially accounts for the arrest disparity
described above. At least one trial-court judge found that the most relevant
decisionmakers were at the institutional level.185 Professor Beckett’s work
also suggests that institutional-level decisionmaking drives racial disparity
in narcotics arrests in Seattle.
The SPD opted for an arrest-intensive narcotics enforcement strategy
that relied upon specialized undercover units. As is true for many big-city
police departments, patrol does not generate high numbers of arrests (for
any sort of offense) per officer in Seattle.186 Specialized narcotics units, on
the other hand, generate high numbers of arrests per officer; this is
particularly true of units that focus on street-level narcotics transactions.
These units typically focus on “retail” transactions, where other specialized
units, often called “Narcotics” or something similar, tend to focus on larger
distributors further up the supply chain.187
For those officers assigned to work street-level details, making arrests
is, quite literally, their daily work.188 In the SPD, “Anti-Crime Teams”
focus on street-level narcotics enforcement,189 and “buy-bust” is among
their staple tactics.190 In a buy-bust, an undercover officer purchases a
small quantity of narcotics using marked currency. Upon completing the
transaction, the undercover officer alerts the “arrest team” with a
prearranged signal. The arrest team then proceeds to arrest the seller and
any individuals who might have helped facilitate the transaction. Although
effective at generating arrests, buy-bust operations are labor-intensive. A

black residents).
184
Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 434.
185
See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb.
14, 2005) (affirming the trial court’s determination that relevant decisionmakers could be in
central command).
186
See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195. To the extent that patrol generates
substantial numbers of arrests, it is typically because so many officers are dedicated to such
units. Patrol typically generates traffic-related arrests (whether for traffic-related offenses,
narcotics, or other contraband), but making arrests is a small fraction of what the unit (and
individual officers in the unit) do. See id.
187
See id. at 192–94.
188
See CONLON, supra note 84, at 157–58 (describing the NYPD).
189
See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195.
190
See Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Drug War: The Crisis of
Credibility in Criminal Justice, in CRACK IN AMERICA 260, 265 (Craig Reinarman & Harry
G. Levine eds., 1997) (noting prevalence of buy-bust operations in various American cities).
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buy-bust in Seattle often involves upwards of ten officers and generates six
to ten arrests.191 The capacity for any precinct to regularly carry out buybusts depends on whether it has sufficient officer resources to do so and
what the enforcement mandate for the particular precinct happens to be.192
Historically, the SPD has used undercover buy-bust operations most
heavily in the downtown precinct where African-American narcotics sellers
are concentrated.193 The vast majority of narcotics arrests made in Seattle
occur downtown.194 The Anti-Crime Teams in the downtown precinct are
afforded the resources and charged with doing narcotics enforcement.195
Although there is considerable outdoor narcotics activity in downtown
Seattle, there is also considerable outdoor activity in other parts of the city,
not to mention indoor activity.196 There are, however, significantly more
African-American participants in outdoor drug transactions in downtown
Seattle than in other parts of the city.197 SPD’s focus on making outdoor
arrests downtown generates the stark racial disparity in narcotics arrests.
But use of arrest-intensive specialization and geographic concentration do
not entirely account for the disparity.
The SPD appears to target its enforcement effort on crack transactions
as opposed to other comparable narcotics.198 This is particularly surprising
given the prevalence of heroin and Seattle’s reputation for being a “heroin
city.”199 The SPD’s narcotics enforcement tactics directed at both indoor
and outdoor narcotics transactions inordinately target crack.200 In fact,
Professor Beckett estimates that nearly 50% of all indoor enforcement
191

See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 198.
See id.
193
See Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 45 (noting that 65% of buy-busts were
concentrated in three downtown census tracts); Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 196
(noting that fewer buy-bust operations occur in the southern suburban areas).
194
See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 197–98 (noting that 54% of all narcotics
arrests were made in the West Precinct, which includes downtown).
195
See id. at 198.
196
See Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 122–23. Indoor enforcement, although more
time-consuming in absolute terms because of the warrant requirement, tends to be more
“productive” when measured in terms of arrests and contraband seized per officer hour. Id.
at 121.
197
Id.
198
See id. at 123 (arguing that the focus on crack drives disparity); Beckett et al., supra
note 168, at 435.
199
See Vanessa Ho, Drug Is Infiltrating All Walks of Seattle Life, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Apr. 13, 2000, at A1.
200
Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 123, 125. Beckett’s analysis suggests that individual
officer discretion also plays a role in targeting crack. Her study revealed that some
individual officers tend to ask for crack when carrying out a buy-bust. See Beckett et al.,
supra note 168, at 429.
192
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operations in Seattle are for crack-related transactions.201 And, this far
exceeds estimates for the proportion of total narcotics transactions that
crack accounts for.202
The SPD has offered some justifications for the racial disparity in
narcotics arrest rates. Those justifications focus on the uniqueness of the
downtown precinct, the heightened dangers created by outdoor narcotics
transactions, and the administrative difficulties of carrying out indoor
narcotics enforcement.203 None of these justifications completely explains
Professor Beckett’s conclusions. Even if they did, it would only beg the
question of whether the SPD was fairly balancing competing goals, by
asking whether the department’s choices to focus on crack, prioritize
outdoor transactions downtown, and use arrests (as opposed to other
deterrence-based tactics) sensibly promote security, public health, or some
other community benefit. That sort of balancing is not for any particular
officer to carry out. It is squarely within the department’s discretionary
ambit.
2. Quality-of-Life Policing
Quality-of-life policing sounds euphemistic when considered from the
vantage of the countless minority arrestees against whom it has been
directed. Such policing places a high premium on arresting individuals
because of their contribution to “disorder” rather than violating any law per
se.204 Again, the three incidents of institutional discretion—geographic
deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics—substantially
account for arrest disparity.
Quality-of-life or “order-maintenance” policing has its theoretical
mooring in James Wilson and George Kelling’s now-iconic “broken
windows” argument.205 Numerous scholars have described it, so only a
brief summary is needed here.206 Wilson and Kelling argued that the
dominant crime-control strategies of the late twentieth century failed, not
only on their own terms, but more generally in making “citizens” feel more
secure.207 Instead of focusing on isolated instances of crime, the broken
201

Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 125.
Id. (estimating that 25% of total drug transactions are for crack).
203
See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb.
14, 2005).
204
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 128.
205
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29.
206
See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 128.
207
KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 70–71. The broken windows theory is not
necessarily built upon an inclusive conceptualization of citizenship. For a discussion of how
202
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windows theory suggests that law enforcement should minimize “low-level
disorder.”208 Panhandling, graffiti, vandalized buildings, street prostitution,
low-level narcotics transactions, squeegeeing, and the like engender public
fear.209 Disorder engenders fear, withdrawal from public space, and serious
crime.210 Urban anonymity fuels disorder and is, in turn, fueled by disorder:
if left unchecked, the feedback loop yields an ever-accelerating descent into
criminogenic pathology.211 Normatively, the broken windows theory
supports the diversion of police resources from 911 call-and-response and
incident-driven crime solving to “order maintenance,” i.e., the containment
and elimination of “low-level disorder.”212 The broken windows theory
counsels in favor of directing resources towards proactive policing, in
which institutional discretion has the greatest sway in determining arrestee
demographics.213 In its theoretical formulation, however, the broken
windows hypothesis does not necessarily counsel in favor of making more
arrests.214 Rather, it stresses the importance of deterring disorder by
increasing the police’s visible presence in a neighborhood through
increased patrols, greater police–citizen contact, and remedying the signs of
disorder.215 Both Kelling and Wilson candidly acknowledge that the
exercise of institutional discretion is the key in creating and shaping an
order-maintenance policing strategy.216
The most notable implementation of order-maintenance policing was
in New York City in the 1990s. Contrary to the theory, however, the
NYPD opted for an arrest-intensive version of order-maintenance policing
dubbed “zero tolerance.”217 During the 1990s, the NYPD dramatically
broken windows assumes and reproduces relations of class dominance, see HARCOURT,
supra note 79, at 215–16 (quoting KELLING & COLES, supra note 26). That an individual’s
feelings of “security” should be a priority for law enforcement represents a recent innovation
in policing theory and one that also assumes and reproduces relations of class dominance.
See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 152–54.
208
KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 15.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 15–16, 20, 242.
211
Id. at 20. The relationships between “disorder” and fear or insecurity were based
exclusively on the authors’ limited observations and informed conjecture. See, e.g., id. at
26–27, 236–37.
212
Id. at 15.
213
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 86, 100.
214
KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 23, 84.
215
Id. at 19.
216
Id. at 170; cf. WILSON, supra note 12, at 100 (noting the extent to which institutional
discretion shapes vice enforcement).
217
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 101; Wynn, supra note 140, at 107. The proponents
of the broken windows theory hardly seemed upset with the arrest-intensive interpretation of
their theory. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 158–70 (praising NYPD’s order-
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increased the number of misdemeanor arrests in what was billed as an effort
to “retake” New York City’s public spaces for law-abiding citizens.218
Although much-touted for reducing crime in New York City,219 quantitative
evidence suggests that factors other than quality-of-life policing account for
the drop.220 What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of arrestees
were minorities.221 The police assessment was, of course, that arrestee
demographics mirror offender demographics.222
Analyzing how
institutional discretion operates in this context goes a long way in
undermining that claim.
i. New York City
Upon taking office, Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner William
Bratton consciously adopted the broken window theory’s core premise:
proactively enforcing against minor crimes decreases more serious crimes
and makes communities feel more secure.223 The NYPD has elected to
enforce against minor crimes using arrest-intensive tactics.
The mayor and police commissioner used the expressions “quality-of
life-policing,”
“zero
tolerance,”
and
“order
maintenance”
interchangeably.224 Both also believed that aggressively and proactively
enforcing against minor crimes would forestall more serious crimes later
and create greater “order.” New York City’s criminal code, like most
others, was replete with crimes that typically went unenforced. The Bratton
NYPD sought to enforce many of these laws both to interdict the specific
behavior criminalized and to contain “disorderly” persons not otherwise
engaging in criminalized conduct.225 The NYPD explicitly prioritized
enforcement against low-level narcotics offenses in public, prostitution,
graffiti, public intoxication, public urination, and a host of pedestrian and

maintenance policing strategy).
218
See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 228 (1998); HARCOURT,
supra note 79, at 10 (noting misdemeanor arrests jumped 50% between 1993 and 1996
despite a constant complaint rate).
219
See, e.g., BRATTON, supra note 218, at 259, 280, 289; Eli B. Silverman, Crime in New
York: A Success Story, PUB. PERSP., June-July 1997, at 3.
220
See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 277 (2006).
221
Andrew Golub et al., Does Quality-of-Life Policing Widen the Net? 11 (Aug. 13,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
198996.pdf.
222
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 174 (quoting Commissioner Safir).
223
See id. 185–86 (quoting Giuliani); BRATTON, supra note 218, at 138, 152, 179.
224
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 50.
225
See Erzen, supra note 149, at 35–36; HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 101–02.
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traffic violations.226 Aggressive enforcement against such minor crimes
was explicitly premised upon the expectation of discovering crimes
unrelated to the reason for arrest or, alternatively, preempting commission
of more serious criminal acts later. For example, the man arrested for
turnstile jumping sometimes turned out to have an outstanding warrant for
failing to appear in court or the man arrested for drinking beer in public
sometimes turned out to possess an unregistered firearm.227
Departmental decisionmakers in no uncertain terms communicated to
line officers that they were to use their arrest power to effect the
department’s quality-of-life agenda.
Many officers understood this
mandate to mean arrest first, ask questions later.228 Departmental
decisionmakers, however, did more than just communicate the importance
of enforcing against minor crimes. Rather, the NYPD’s order-maintenance
program embraced an incapacitation scheme that sought to take the
“disorderly” off the streets altogether. As discussed below, the designation
“disorderly” is far from objective, particularly given the extent to which
race and class shape perceptions of disorder.229 Towards that end, the
department privileged high arrest rates as the rubric of success and tailored
geographic deployment and used specialized units accordingly.
To execute its order-maintenance scheme, the NYPD relied upon
arrest-intensive, specialized units and created new incentives for patrol
officers to make more arrests.230 Targeting low-level narcotics transactions
in public spaces was a high priority for the NYPD under Bratton. The
department increased its spending on arrest-intensive narcotics units.231
The department also increased the number of officers and times of day that
the specialized units engaged in undercover operations such as buy-bust
operations.232 Later in the 1990s, under Commissioner Howard Safir, the
department increased the number of officers in specialized street-crimes
units with a principal mandate of weapons interdiction.233 The street-crimes
units made aggressive use of stop-and-frisk tactics in their efforts. The
tactics were controversial because of the impact on innocent minority

226

BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227–29.
See id. at 168, 214, 229.
228
See Wynn, supra note 140, at 109–11.
229
See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167, at 323.
230
See Wynn, supra note 140, at 111 (citing George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton,
Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 1217 (1998)).
231
See BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227–28.
232
Id.; see supra notes 186–197 and accompanying text (discussing racial disparity
generated by Seattle Police Department’s reliance on buy-bust operations).
233
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 50.
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pedestrians.234 The arrestee demographic deserves as much scrutiny. The
focus on low-level marijuana arrests has continued to the present day.235
The NYPD arrested a record 40,300 individuals in 2008 for misdemeanor
marijuana offenses.236 The vast majority of these arrestees were minorities,
and specialized undercover narcotics units made nearly half of the arrests.237
The NYPD’s reliance on arrest-intensive specialized units was not simply
limited to guns and narcotics.238 Undercover street-crimes units were
directed to arrest individuals for a host of quality-of-life crimes. Among the
more notable examples was the apprehension of turnstile jumpers.239
Under its zero-tolerance mandate, the NYPD converted patrol into a
more arrest-intensive unit than is typically true.240 The department
accomplished this by requiring patrol officers to arrest where they had
previously issued citations and by using officer’s arrest figures as a measure
of occupational success. Many of the misdemeanors that were at the heart
of New York City’s order-maintenance scheme had erstwhile been offenses
for which officers, in their discretion, issued citations or simply ignored.241
This was true for various “public nuisances” such as drinking, public
urination, panhandling, prostitution, and smoking marijuana.242 The zerotolerance mandate for such disorderly persons was to take them off the
street. Patrol officers were no longer to be lenient upon encountering such
persons. Not only did the department instruct patrol officers to make more
arrests,243 but management was supposed to monitor arrest numbers
generated by individual patrol officers.244 At least some patrol officers
234

See generally ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND
FRISK” PRACTICES (1999) (discussing disparate impact of the NYPD’s stop and frisk
practices on minorities).
235
See Dwyer, supra note 150.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Some have argued that the NYPD’s aggressive stop-and-frisk policing played a
significant role in reducing New York City’s homicide rate in the mid-1990s. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio,
43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 326–28 (2010) (extrapolating from studies of intensive patrol in
specific, high-crime locations).
239
See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 3.
240
BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227; see also Wynn, supra note 140, at 111 (citing
Kelling & Bratton, supra note 230); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of
Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 175 (1999) (citing
BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227).
241
BRATTON, supra note 218, at xv, 153, 155, 229.
242
Id. at 228–29; Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor
Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2007).
243
See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140, at 18.
244
See WYNN, supra note 140, at 112.
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understood this to mean that they should arrest whenever encountering a
“disorderly” person.245 Unsurprisingly, the effects of the new arrestintensive approach were not evenly distributed across the city.
To understand why misdemeanor narcotics arrestees were inordinately
minorities, the NYPD’s enforcement priorities and use of arrests must be
understood in conjunction with geographic deployment decisions.246 There
is mixed evidence on whether, given an opportunity, any particular
individual NYPD officer would elect to arrest a minority offender over a
white one.247 But, as discussed, patterns of residential segregation make
individual officer discretion less of a factor than institutional discretion in
accounting for arrestee demographics. New York City is no exception.
There have been multiple studies focusing on misdemeanor marijuanapossession arrests, a hallmark of zero-tolerance policing.248 The studies
conclude that, from the late 1990s onward, the NYPD has targeted poor
minority communities for misdemeanor arrests.249 Although no one has
undertaken a comprehensive study of the geographic distribution of qualityof-life arrests in New York City, the number of minorities involved in
marijuana arrests suggests that the NYPD directed arrest-intensive policing
at minorities.
The spatial logic of zero-tolerance policing in New York City revolved
around the twin axes of high crime and disorder. The two were often
elided, but the former was identified through quantitative measures while
the latter was not. Under Bratton, the NYPD began using Compstat, a
computerized tool for tracking crime reports and arrests.250 Because
Compstat only accounts for reported crime, it did not necessarily create a
245

See id. at 118–19.
HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 10 (discussing misdemeanor arrests in New York City).
Researchers have found that the demographic profile of those arrested for quality-of-life type
offenses is similar to that of those arrested for more serious offenses. In both cases the
profile is largely minority. Quality-of-life policing, thus, did not shift the demographic
profile of arrestees. It increased the number of misdemeanors arrestees across the board.
See Golub et al., supra note 221, at 15.
247
See Fagan et al., supra note 55, at 820 (noting that officers are more likely to arrest a
white individual than an individual of a minority once stop has been effected).
248
See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140; Golub et. al., supra note 242; Andrew Golub et
al., Smoking Marijuana in Public: The Spatial and Policy Shift in New York City Arrests
1992-2003, 3 HARM REDUCTION J. no. 22, Aug. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-3-22.pdf.
249
See Golub et. al., supra note 248, at 23. The study notes, however, that in the early
1990s, the NYPD focused its enforcement efforts in lower Manhattan. The demographic
profile of arrestees was nonetheless overwhelmingly minority, suggesting an inordinately
minority offender population or racial bias (whether implicit or explicit) on the part of
individual officers. See id. at 9, 23.
250
See BRATTON, supra note 218, at 233–39.
246
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portrait of low-level crimes that are at the core of the broken windows
theory.251 Nonetheless, because the broken window theory posits a direct
relationship between quality-of-life crimes and more serious crimes, the
department targeted “high crime” areas—low income, minority
neighborhoods tend to have higher rates of reported crime than other
neighborhoods—for zero-tolerance policing.252 This targeting was based on
the assumption that incapacitating low-level offenders would have
ameliorative effects on serious crime, even if particular reported incidents
of serious crime went unsolved.
Even more troubling is the extent to which generic notions of disorder
animated zero-tolerance policing. The authors of the broken windows
theory suggest a highly impressionistic understanding of disorder. Their
conception is shot through with middle-class assumptions of what urban
decay looks like.253 While the theory of order maintenance assumes that
“disorder” can be objectively distinguished from “order,”254 both are deeply
subjective.255 Based on survey data, Sampson and Raudenbush have
concluded that the racial and economic makeup of a neighborhood go much
further in predicting observers’ perceptions of disorder than does any
objective standard of disorder.256 One’s ability to recognize disorder is a
product of cultural cognition and, accordingly, structured by race and class
affinities—affinities that one might not consciously espouse.257 There is
limited, anecdotal evidence to suggest that the NYPD, like other police
departments, made deployment decisions based on just such perceptions of
“disorder.”258
ii. Chicago’s Anti-Gang Ordinance
Although Chicago did not embrace as comprehensive a zero-tolerance
policing program as New York City did, it did target gangs with an antiloitering ordinance that might be considered an example of ordermaintenance policing.259
251

Compstat also creates incentives for police to underreport crimes. See Rayman, supra
note 105.
252
See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140, at 48 (noting and criticizing NYPD’s claim that
low-level marijuana enforcement reduces more serious crime).
253
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 215–16 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note
205).
254
See id. at 132–34.
255
See generally Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167 (discussing the connection
between perception and disorder).
256
See id. at 323.
257
See id. at 320.
258
See id.
259
See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 1–3.
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The ordinance, enacted in 1992, became the subject of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Chicago v. Morales.260 The ordinance empowered the
police to order known gang members found “loitering in any public place
with one or more other persons” to disperse.261 The city council assumed
that there was a causal relationship between loitering and more serious
crimes.262 It further empowered the police to arrest anyone failing to obey
the dispersal command.263 Before it was finally held unconstitutional, the
police arrested 42,000 persons for violating the ordinance.264 The Supreme
Court struck the ordinance down on due process grounds, explaining that
the generic prohibition of “loitering” encompasses much “innocent
conduct” and thus leaves “lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment
of the policeman on his beat.”265
The Chicago gang ordinance highlights institutional discretion’s
relationship with racial disparity in arrest rates. The department’s role in
making deployment decisions likely had significantly more to do with the
demographic profile of arrestees than did any individual officer’s exercise
of discretion. A departmental general order directed district commanders to
designate those areas, frequented by gang members, in which the ordinance
would be enforced.266 In Morales, the Court rejected Chicago’s argument
that the police department’s general order sufficiently limited individual
officer discretion.267 The Court may have been right to reject the argument
as a technical matter, but the notion that simply replacing the word
“loitering” in the ordinance with more specific words would prevent
arbitrary or racially skewed enforcement is implausible. Even without the
ordinance, there were already numerous laws on the books that permitted
similar kinds of order-maintenance policing.268 Changing the statute’s
wording essentially solved the vagueness problem. Fine-grained lexical
distinctions in law tend not to have significant impact on an individual
260

See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
Id. at 41.
262
City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997) (quoting ordinance
preamble). Before the Supreme Court, Chicago argued that the ordinance actually prevented
a substantial number of more serious crimes. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 48. Subsequent
research, however, calls this conclusion into question. See HARCOURT, supra note 79, 104–
06 (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer & Albert W. Alschuler, Getting the Facts Straight: Crime
Trends, Community Support, and the Police Enforcement of ‘Social Norms,’ LAW & SOC’Y
REV. (2000)).
263
Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58.
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Morales, 527 U.S. at 49 (relying on the City of Chicago’s brief).
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Id. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983)).
266
Id. at 48.
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Id. at 62.
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Id. at 52.
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officer’s decisionmaking in the field.269 However, personnel policies and
orders from senior command do, particularly in the proactive policing
context.270 To the extent that the Chicago Police Department directs
officers to go to particular areas and make arrests, individual officers will
do so. And to the extent that the individuals loitering on the street are all
young men of color, it is inevitable that the arrestees will be as well. The
decisive moments of discretionary decisionmaking will have occurred
before the arresting officers even leave the precinct station.
Morales, like criminal procedure generally, tells us virtually nothing
about how to understand the relationship between departmental discretion
and race, let alone how that relationship ought to be calibrated to serve
democratic principles.
IV. POLICING POLICE DEPARTMENTS
Distributive justice theory suggests a much more active role for courts
and prosecutors in regulating the three dimensions of departmental
discretion identified in Part III. In proactive policing, police departments
have considerable discretion to ration arrests as they see fit. These
departmental choices generate winners and losers, with significant
distributive consequences. This Section argues that the law should treat
proactive policing arrests as distributive goods. It follows that departmental
discretion should be regulated to control for inegalitarian consequences.
A. ARREST AS A DISTRIBUTIVE PHENOMENON

Distributive justice is concerned with how democratic institutions in a
community of autonomous individuals should ensure equal distributions of
rights, resources, and obligations.271 This Subsection will show that arrest

269
See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski, Organizational Determinants of Police Discretion:
The Case of Drinking-Driving, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 387, 394 (1987) (arguing that the existence
of criminal law is only one factor in explaining officer decisionmaking); Meghan Stroshine,
The Influence of “Working Rules” on Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making,
11 POLICE Q. 315, 320 (2008) (noting that police rely on “rules of thumb” rather than legal
specifics).
270
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49.
271
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3–4 (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–6 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971); see also
Samuel Scheffler, The Morality of Criminal Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 965, 966 (2000) (noting
that distributive justice is preoccupied with institutionally defined entitlements and presumes
no desert preceding such). Rawls and Ackerman represent contemporary examples of the
social-contract tradition, which presupposes that self-possessed individuals can make
agreements. For a discussion of the implicit identity assumptions upon which such theory
depends, see Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality & Identity Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 349,
364–70 (2008).
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policy can implicate all three. Arrest policy can impinge upon the right to
be free of discrimination, limit economic and social opportunities, and
differentially enforce the obligation to abide by the law. Part III showed
that arrest is not the inevitable consequence of law-breaking; this is most
acutely true in the proactive policing context. There, enforcement
opportunities far exceed enforcement resources and departments have
substantial discretion to selectively apply those resources. Because this is
true, evaluating whether a police department employs its arrest discretion
justly is not reducible to the question of whether each individual arrest is
carried out lawfully. In contrast to the dominant theories of criminal
punishment, distributive justice focuses on whether institutional policies
spread costs and benefits across a heterogeneous citizenry in an egalitarian
manner. I argue that arrest distribution will be egalitarian when it is in
keeping with what the relevant political community would have authorized
had its members: (1) possessed accurate information regarding the
prevalence and distribution of criminal misconduct, and (2) been willing to
absorb the range of costs associated with arrests in proportion to actual lawbreaking in their immediate social orbit—members of the relevant
community would make choices expecting enforcement intensity to impact
their family members, neighbors, colleagues, etc., in strict proportion to the
actual law-breaking that occurs amongst those individuals.
Dominant theories of the criminal sanction offer little guidance on
whether or how egalitarian principles should structure criminal law
enforcement.
By “dominant,” I mean utilitarian, retributive, and
expressivist theories.272 It is beyond this paper’s scope to offer more than a
cursory account of each. Expressivism and retribution justify criminal
enforcement by reference to a community’s moral norms, i.e., criminal
sanction is the social expression of moral condemnation.273 Retributive
theories typically assume Kantian notions of moral agency and
responsibility—the criminal sanction ought to be imposed in accordance
with an individual’s moral desert.274 Expressivist theories, on the other
hand, view condemnation as a means for communities to reaffirm their own
foundational, moral tenets.275 Morally anchored conceptualizations of the
criminal sanction suggest that the police ought to pursue offenders in order
272

See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET.

AL.,

CRIMINAL LAW CASES & MATERIALS 31–71 (6th ed.

2008).
273

See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING &
DESERVING 95, 99–100 (1970) (citing Henry Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 408 (1958)).
274
See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. R. 3, 5 (1955).
275
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 273, at 115 (arguing that punishment is a ritualized
disavowal of the offending act).
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of moral depravity. Only at the highest level of generality is it true that
police departments actually do this; for example, most police departments
would prioritize homicide investigations over petty theft investigations.
That said, within the context of proactive policing, there is little to suggest
that police departments are able to rank priorities according to moral
exigency. It is unsurprising that moral exigency is an unwieldy mechanism
for allocating scarce resources. In a pluralistic society, moral questions are
the source of contentious disagreement.276 For petty narcotics, quality-oflife, and other minor crimes, offenders’ moral depravity affords limited
justification for imposition of the criminal sanction at all, let alone
providing a guide for allocating scarce enforcement resources between
different target groups.
At first glance, utilitarian theories seem more promising for regulating
police discretion because they are explicitly concerned with costs and
benefits. Utilitarianism, however, is largely concerned with maximizing the
latter and minimizing the former without regard for how either is distributed
across members of a community. Utilitarianism is not preoccupied with
whether any particular distribution is, in and of itself, equitable. Even when
concerned with policing’s negative effects upon disadvantaged populations,
utilitarian approaches instrumentalize those effects, casting them in terms of
optimal deterrence. For example, some have argued that overly aggressive
policing undermines the police’s legitimacy in poor neighborhoods and,
consequently, erodes residents’ commitment to abiding by the law and
cooperating with the police.277 The most salient concern here is preventing
law-breaking in poor communities.278 Distributive concerns are not
important in and of themselves, but only to the extent that they consolidate
law enforcement’s legitimacy and, correspondingly, poor communities’
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. Put more generally, a
utilitarian approach to policing will counsel in favor of enforcing against
those offenders where deterrence is obtained most efficiently. Such an
approach need not target those offenses or offenders that impose the
greatest costs upon the relevant community. Utilitarianism, however, does
overlap with distributive justice to the extent that both direct institutions to
take a broad and thorough account of policies’ costs and benefits.
Distributive justice, however, seeks to ensure an egalitarian distribution of
both costs and benefits as an end, in and of itself.
276

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
433, 477 (1999) (discussing how political dialogue around expressive values is contentious).
277
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003).
278
See, e.g., Meares, supra note 35, at 681–82 (arguing that a lack of well-entrenched
norms in poor communities accounts for failure to comply with law).
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While criminal procedure scholars have noted that policing has a
redistributive dimension,279 no one has systematically analyzed policing
through the lens of distributive justice.280 Professor Stuntz, for example,
has noted that policing is redistributive because the most intensive policing
does not occur in those neighborhoods that foot most of the tax bill.281
Professor Sklansky has suggested that policing should promote
egalitarianism.282 Neither, however, specifically addresses what distributive
justice theory might require of police departments.283
Both utilitarianism and distributive justice require identification of
proactive policing’s costs and benefits. As shorthand, one might think of
security as policing’s primary benefit.284 On the other side of the scale,
policing imposes obvious costs on taxpayers and the individuals who are
arrested.285 The analysis of costs, however, should not end there. Policing
generates a host of additional, less-obvious costs that recent scholarship has
identified. Those costs include arrests’ long-term consequences upon
arrestees’ earning and productive capacities, the collateral consequences
upon arrestees’ families and communities, and the consequences upon
crime control itself.286 Scholars have persuasively argued that focusing law

279

See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699,
1821 (2005); Stuntz, supra note 160, at 823, 832.
280
See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 160, at 832. By the same token, distributive justice
theorists have not focused on criminal justice. For example, Bruce Ackerman devotes only a
handful of pages to criminal law, see ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 83–88, while John
Rawls devotes none at all, see RAWLS, supra note 271. One notable exception is Sharon
Dolovich’s extrapolation from Rawls. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004). Dolovich attempts to make up for Rawls’s
silence on criminal justice by identifying the foundational agreements that a modified
Rawlsian “original position” would have generated regarding criminal justice. Id. at 326–28.
Dolovich does not speak to arrest policy specifically, but does identify abstract principles
governing punishment. See id. at 408–09.
281
See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2149
(2002).
282
See Sklansky, supra note 279, at 1821–22 (discussing how privatization of police
functions threatens egalitarianism).
283
See id.; see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 323, 326 (2004) (arguing for greater use of cost-benefit analysis in criminal law);
Stuntz, supra note 280, at 823 (noting that police undertake cost-benefit analysis when
deciding where to devote proactive policing resources).
284
By “security” I mean some objective measure of harm prevention, not simply the
amelioration of individuals’ subjective fear. The latter tends to be exaggerated and
racialized in ways that drive some of the institutional dynamics described in this Article.
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 79, at 75–76.
285
See Stuntz, supra note 281, at 2164–66.
286
See Brown, supra note 283, at 345–48 (summarizing research on costs of criminal
law enforcement).
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enforcement upon specific groups may actually increase crime rates.287
That police departments consistently get the cost-benefit balance
egregiously wrong, particularly within minority neighborhoods,288 is likely
because police overlook the less obvious, less easily quantified costs of
what they do. Quantifying these costs presents a challenge to any utilitarian
approach, but particularly those that suggest technocratic regulation of the
police, i.e., an approach which assumes that a bureaucratic regulator can
weigh costs and benefits with some empirical certainty.289 The problem is
that many of the “costs” and “benefits” at play in policing require value
judgments about competing priorities. Such costs and benefits, by
definition, resist quantification, presenting themselves as incommensurate.
That is to say that utilitarian approaches may call for the impossible task of
balancing what are essentially expressivist commitments.290 For example,
consider how an administrative rulemaker would balance the costs and
benefits of arresting juvenile taggers. What if some of the taggers produce
murals that many residents actually think of as public art? How should
enforcing against tagging be balanced against other crimes?
Distributive justice recognizes the inherently political nature of such
judgments.291 It is appropriate to leave such difficult, value-laden questions
to the political process, so long as that process operates within specified
constraints. Distributive justice imposes limitations upon the democratic
process such that it cannot be used to advance majoritarian (or parochial)
interests that undermine fundamental liberal principles, including
egalitarianism.292 The state may not distribute benefits or burdens on the
basis of morally irrelevant social attributes, even if supported by a
democratic majority.293 Thus there must be constraints on the democratic

287

See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 122–25 (discussing the connection between
racial targeting decreasing crime and the dependency on the relative elasticity of different
groups to policing); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–
36 (2008) (discussing how overenforcing criminal laws may erode community support for
the police, which, in turn, leads to increased crime).
288
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox
of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES 3, 20–21 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M Kahan eds.,
1999) (criticizing civil libertarians for focusing on minority crime suspects’ rights at the
expense of minority crime victims’ rights); Meares, supra note 35, at 696–702 (arguing that
police overenforce narcotics and minor crimes in minority communities, but generally
underenforce serious crimes); Natapoff, supra note 35, at 1772 (arguing the same).
289
Cf. Brown, supra note 283, at 352–57.
290
Cf. Kahan, supra note 276, at 427–28.
291
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3–4 (1993).
292
See id. at xxiii–l, 41.
293
See RAWLS, supra note 271, at 129.
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process that forbid infringement on fundamental rights and equality.294 As
discussed in the next subsection, this notion resonates with a democraticrepresentation-reinforcing theory of judicial review. Before considering the
courts’ role in regulating police department discretion, however, one must
understand what an equal distribution of arrests should entail.
Distributive justice does not require absolute equality. John Rawls’s
two principles of justice, for example, permit inequality within roughly
defined limits.295 The first principle requires the “most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties” that are consistent with organized coexistence.296 The
second principle requires that any social and economic inequality be
organized such that it inures to everyone’s benefit.297 The first principle
permits deprivations of liberty for those who have grievously impinged
upon others’ basic liberties, so that equal liberties are permitted only as far
as is consistent with everyone having those liberties.298 Punishing violent
crimes or crimes against property, for example, would be consistent with
the first principle.299 The second principle permits inequality to the extent
that those who are uniquely productive or talented may take a larger share
of the economic pie if their activities expand the pie for all, particularly the
disadvantaged.300 Distributive justice will be served when democratic
institutions solve problems within the bounds suggested by the two
principles of justice. That process will generate winners and losers, but
distributive justice limits the bases upon which distinctions may be made
and the scope of any resulting inequalities.
Distributive justice suggests two basic points about when the political
process will yield outcomes consistent with Rawls’s two principles of
justice: when participants are well-informed and imagine themselves as
both the potential beneficiaries and cost-bearers of their political choices.301
Put differently, popular politics will yield egalitarian outcomes when

294

See RAWLS, supra note 291, at 41.
These two principles anchor Rawls’s entire conception of liberal justice. RAWLS,
supra note 271, at 10–14.
296
Id. at 53.
297
Id.
298
Id. Equal liberty for all, by definition, cannot include the freedom to restrict others’
liberty.
299
While Rawls himself is not explicit about this, Professor Dolovich has persuasively
demonstrated that, with slight modifications, Rawls’s model generates principles of
punishment. Dolovich, supra note 280, at 328 (noting modification for partial compliance).
300
RAWLS, supra note 271, at 65–66.
301
Id. at 314–15 (describing an idealized legislative process). The principles of justice
are themselves generated by an idealized democratic deliberation. Id. at 15 (describing the
“original position”).
295
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citizens are well-informed and “other regarding.”302 To imagine oneself as
a potential beneficiary or cost-bearer requires citizens to have the capacity
for imagining themselves in the shoes of their co-citizens, particularly those
who are less advantaged.303 This, of course, is a highly idealized vision of
citizenship and political community—these ideals are intended to serve
both as a model for our political institutions and for identifying the specific
constraints that should be imposed upon such political institutions and
processes.304 Of course our is is a far cry from Rawls’s ought. That is
doubly true for the politics of criminal justice.
The actual politics of crime in the United States scarcely resembles
these liberal ideals.305 Professor Stuntz has described America’s politics of
crime as “pathological.”306 Jonathan Simon has convincingly argued that
middle-class voters imagine their political agency in a language of
“victimhood” that presupposes a racialized divide between criminals and
victims.307 Political discourse around crime has expressly cast “criminals”
as poor minorities—Michelle Alexander has recently described how that
has been an express tactic of political campaigns since the 1960s.308 And it
has been a successful tactic—at least, if one imagines “success” in terms of
winning office.309 This politics plays a substantial role in producing the
glaring disparities in arrest rates for non-violent crime.310 Michael Tonry
has suggested that the political expendability and rhetorical criminalization
of poor, urban minorities made them the most obvious “enemy” in the war

302

See ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 6–7, 11, 72–73 (explaining that idealized
liberalism is one in which individuals work out distributive questions through dialogue
without recourse to claims of superiority); RAWLS, supra note 271, at 118–19 (“They must
choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever
generation they turn out to belong to.”). In his later work, Rawls described the relation that
prevails between members of the political community as “civic friendship.” RAWLS, supra
note 291, at xlix.
303
See RAWLS, supra note 271, at 453; see also JURGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF
THE OTHER 96 (1998) (noting that Rawls’s “original position” actually describes a state of
intersubjective connection between all members of the political community); Dolovich,
supra note 280, at 332–34 (describing the “veil of ignorance”).
304
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 291, at 25–26 (noting that the original position is an
analytical device and should not be confused with the actual political world).
305
See Dolovich, supra note 280, at 430–40.
306
See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 505; see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2003 (arguing
that the suburbanization-generated white voting block undermines egalitarianism).
307
SIMON, supra note 79, at 76.
308
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 43–45 (2010) (describing the Republican
Party’s use of criminal justice as a racial “wedge” issue in the 1960s).
309
Id. at 44–47.
310
Id. at 44–56.
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on drugs.311 This has all played out in a broader context marked by
increased hostility to welfarism. Middle-class voters’ hostility to welfare
has choked public services for the poor and impelled the withdrawal of such
state agencies from the poorest neighborhoods. Loic Waquant has
convincingly shown that American cities have left it almost exclusively to
police to “manage” the poor.312
Some criminal justice scholars have posited that local communities
approximate the liberal ideal because of the associations between victims,
offenders, and other residents.313 Many have criticized this view of
localism.314 First, it assumes that police departments are politically
accountable, which is not necessarily true.315 Second, “process failure” is
not unique to large political communities—majorities and minorities can
form in small communities, and the former can be very parochial.316 And
third, police authority is not delimited in sub-local terms, but rather in terms
of the larger political unit; i.e., police departments are city or county
agencies. Contests over departmental discretion will often implicate the
interests of multiple sub-local communities.317 For example, intensive
concentration of police resources in one neighborhood may come at the
expense of deploying resources in another or even result in crime being
displaced to another neighborhood. There is little reason to think that
voters in American cities will behave in a manner that is consistent with

311

TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13.
LOIC WAQUANT, URBAN OUTCASTS 12, 30–34 (2008).
313
See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis Of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1161, 1182 (1998); see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2031–32
(arguing for more local control over criminal justice system). But see Richard C. Schragger,
The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 385–86 (2001) (arguing that the social norms
scholars do not adequately address how to define a “community”); Robert Weisberg, Norms
and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 467, 508–14 (2003) (criticizing the “social norms” approach to policing the
“inner city”).
314
See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005, 1010 (2003); David Cole,
Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal
Justice Scholarhip, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1086 (1999) (“[O]nce one looks beyond romanticized
invocations of ‘the community,’ it becomes apparent that no community is united on these
issues.”); Schragger, supra note 313, at 416–58; Weisberg, supra note 313, at 508–14.
315
See WILSON, supra note 12, at 230–33; supra note 125 and accompanying text.
316
See VENKATESH, supra note 93, at 72 (noting that community policing meetings
favored those with “social clout” in the neighborhood); Schragger, supra note 313, at 445
(“[T]he disenfranchised and marginal are almost never considered members of any
community.”).
317
See Schragger, supra note 313, at 470–71 (“[W]hat is called ‘local’ is always
‘interlocal.’”).
312
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liberal principles of equality,318 although a few might.319
All of this is to say that popular politics are not likely to act as a
meaningful constraint on police departments. It should be up to legal
institutions to make up for that.
B. “POLITICAL FAILURE” AND DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION

Distributive justice principles suggest that law ought to guarantee an
egalitarian distribution of proactive policing’s costs and benefits when
majoritarian politics cannot. Building on the discussion above, this
Subsection shows that courts should ensure that members of the relevant
political community (1) bear a fair share of proactive policing’s costs,
including those associated with arrest, and (2) have full information as to
crime’s occurrence and the demographic profile generated by proactive
policing arrests.
Rawls himself suggested that it may be up to the “judicial virtues [of]
impartiality and considerateness” to effect liberal justice in the real
world.320 His ambition was to formulate an “objective” measure of liberal
justice that could be held up to our own political institutions.321 Where they
fail to live up to those standards, we might reasonably expect that the
judicial virtues would save us. This hope resonates with other liberal
conceptions of judicial review,322 including John Ely’s.323 In his famous
formulation, Ely argues that constitutional courts ought to constrain
political majorities’ ability to systematically impose costs upon a disfavored
minority.324 Because minorities cannot use the political process to
challenge such an imposition, Ely argues that constitutional courts should
disallow it. This is tantamount to empowering courts to compel the
outcome that would have resulted had the majority behaved in a manner
consistent with idealized democratic fairness—i.e., a manner in which
318

See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2003.
A number of jurisdictions have passed laws directing law enforcement to de-prioritize
enforcement against marijuana possession. See Phillip Smith, Lowest Law Enforcement
Priority Marijuana Initiatives Face the Voters in Five Cities, DRUG WAR CHRON. (Oct. 26,
2006, 5:51 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/459/marijuana_lowest_enforcement_
priority_initiatives.
320
RAWLS, supra note 271, at 453.
321
Id.
322
ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 311.
323
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980) (establishing that a
distributive scheme that is just requires judicial analysis of the process that produced it). But
see Kahan & Meares, supra note 313, at 1161, 1172 (arguing that police departments are
accountable to minorities as evidenced by the number of black political leaders and police
officers).
324
ELY, supra note 323, at 151.
319
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individual citizens, given full information, impose only those costs that they
themselves would be willing to bear.325
The obligation to distribute policing costs equitably ought to require
police departments to make arrests in proportion to the rate of specific
criminal misconduct in specific areas. Police departments should not arrest
offenders in one community while allowing those in another community to
engage in similar conduct with impunity.326 That is to say, law should
regulate police departments’ geographic deployment, enforcement priority,
and tactical policies in order to minimize disparate impact on minority
offenders. For example, where drug crimes regularly occur in both wealthy
and poor sections of a city, law enforcement should be required to make
arrests in both parts of town. The same would hold true for all minor
crimes that are the subject of proactive policing. If arrest-intensive units are
to be deployed against low-income minorities for narcotics possession
offenses,327 then so should they be against middle-class offenders who
engage in comparable conduct. Not only will this outcome, in and of itself,
be consistent with egalitarianism, it will also enhance popular democracy’s
capacity for producing egalitarian results. If the costs of proactive policing
are evenly distributed, one would expect the political process to be a greater
source of equality-enhancing pressure upon police departments—i.e., if
politically empowered citizens dislike the effects of proactive policing in
their communities, they are likely to bring their political power to bear on
police departments and, perhaps more importantly, on legislatures to
criminalize in a more restrained and circumspect way.328
An egalitarian mandate also counsels against making geographic
deployment and enforcement priority choices based on highly subjective,
impressionistic criteria such as the “disorderliness” of a neighborhood. As
discussed above, social science research suggests that race and class
stereotypes tend to animate such judgments. Because of its emphasis on
disorderliness, policymaking regarding quality-of-life policing is
particularly vulnerable to bias.329 An egalitarian mandate would require
police departments to make proactive policing arrests in proportion to the
actual rates of offense-specific misconduct in particular places. Requiring
325
See id. at 170 (arguing there is no danger of constitutional infirmity where a majority
has elected to impose a cost upon itself).
326
Cf. Stuntz, supra note 160, at 826 (suggesting that law ought to pay attention to
criminal law outcomes, not just processes).
327
See Dwyer, supra note 150.
328
Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004) (noting police practice that has broad
impact is the type that can be challenged through the political process).
329
See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167, at 323 (arguing that perceptions of
“social disorder” are more a function of race and class assumptions than of actual disorder).
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police departments to distribute proactive policing arrests in this manner
generates operational questions for which I can only give schematic
answers at this point.
Courts and prosecutors should guarantee the equitable distribution of
proactive policing arrests. Because they have substantial charging
discretion, prosecutors exert indirect control over police departments’ arrest
choices.330 If prosecutors refused to charge cases that contribute to an
unjustifiably non-white conviction rate, for example, that might induce
police departments to calibrate their enforcement choices to produce a
balanced arrestee demographic. Prosecutorial regulation, however, is an
imperfect solution to the police discretion problem. Whether prosecutors
are able to use charging decisions to regulate police discretion will turn on
the relationships between the police department, prosecutor’s office, and the
electorate. Because they are typically elected, prosecutors are likely more
influenced by popular politics (and, thus, vulnerable to political failure)
than police departments. It may be politically unpalatable for a prosecutor
to refuse prosecuting substantial numbers of arrests. Therefore, it is
unlikely that many prosecutors would, sua sponte, regulate departmental
discretion in the manner distributive justice suggests.331
Courts should play the central role in preventing police discretion from
undermining egalitarianism. Although criminal courts are equipped to
interrogate exercises of individual officer discretion, interrogating exercises
of institutional discretion will entail a host of evidentiary and other practical
challenges. Judging whether a police department distributes arrests equally
will require delving into police departments’ decisionmaking processes. As
with any challenge of institutional practice, such litigation could be timeconsuming and complex. Criminal defendants would often have an
incentive to litigate such claims in cases generated by proactive policing. It
may be that permitting such in the context of ordinary criminal prosecutions
would impose a substantial burden on criminal courts; however, this would
be most true early on. Over time, one would expect that police departments
would begin distributing proactive policing arrests equally or develop the
capacity for demonstrating how differential arrest rates were tied to
differential offense rates.
Another, less compelling, alternative might be to vest the authority to
bring such suits in a federal agency. The Department of Justice currently
has the power to bring challenges against police departments that engage in
330
See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 778 (2003) (describing the relationship between federal
prosecutors and enforcement agents).
331
See Stuntz, supra note 160, at 836 (suggesting that prosecutors be made to
demonstrate equality in charging decisions).
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systematic and egregious misconduct.332 An analogous mechanism to
regulate arrest disparity might allow for challenging those police
departments that have the worst records for arrest disparity.333 The federal
government is much better equipped than individual defense attorneys or
defender agencies to gather the data and develop the metrics that will be
necessary to evaluate departmental discretion. However, given the
Department of Justice’s limited use of § 14141 to date, it is hard to imagine
the Department using it aggressively to check arrest disparity, even if
empowered to do so.
Critics will charge that courts are ill-equipped to balance competing
crime-control priorities and therefore should not second-guess police
department policymaking. Judicial review of arrest distribution, however,
need not amount to wholesale second-guessing of police department
policymaking. Equal enforcement is potentially consistent with a wide
array of enforcement (and non-enforcement) decisions. Police departments
should be free to constructively use their expertise to make those decisions
in the manner that best responds to local conditions, provided that the
decisionmaking protocol reflects equality concerns. Courts should ensure
the legal adequacy of any given protocol and that any given police
department is actually adhering to it. There is a rough precedent for such in
the Court’s checkpoint cases under the Fourth Amendment. Police are free
to carry out stops without individualized suspicion at a fixed checkpoint,
provided that it is deployed for a permissible purpose and there is a protocol
regulating officer conduct at the checkpoint so as to minimize its
intrusiveness for motorists.334 The Court has not specifically enumerated
what kinds of purposes are acceptable or, specifically, how officer
discretion is to be circumscribed.335 Police departments retain discretion to
craft such policy as required by circumstances, provided that it is exercised
within the general parameters specified by the Court.336 An equality
332
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006); see also Stuntz, supra note 160, at 828–30 (arguing
that § 14141 creates an important tool for regulating police departments).
333
See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that DOJ ought to enforce § 14141 against the worst
offenders first).
334
See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000); Mich. Dept. State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (holding a DUI checkpoint permissible in part because stops
were conducted pursuant to department-issued guidelines).
335
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (leaving it to police departments to use checkpoints for
an unspecified range of purposes provided that they are not used for “ordinary crime
control”); see also Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(upholding preliminary injunction of a police checkpoint that restricted entry to a
Washington, D.C., neighborhood in which numerous assaults and homicides had occurred).
336
But see Jason Fiebig, Comment, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance from the
Supreme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia, 100
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mandate would function similarly. Courts would not require that police
enforce any specific law in any specific way, but only that whatever
proactive policing they elect to do generally comply with an egalitarian
arrest mandate.
There are significant informational challenges for regulating arrest
disparity. In particular, effective regulation will require developing the
capacity for generating three kinds of data: (1) offense rates for particular
crimes in particular places, (2) the demographic profile of arrestees by
crime and location, and (3) detailed accounts of decisionmaking processes
in police departments.337
The first category of information presents a challenge in that
individuals engaged in criminal activity do not typically offer themselves
up for counting. That said, with proper investment, it is possible to develop
techniques for estimating offense rates for particular crimes amongst
different groups in a city.338 More than just that, however, it will be
important to develop metrics for comparing crime-control exigencies across
criminal-law categories. There will be rare instances where police
departments enforce against particular crimes while permitting precisely
identical conduct in another part of the city. Police departments must often
distinguish between offenses that are comparable, but not identical, e.g.,
crack sales in a park versus ecstasy sales in a club. More difficult yet will
be comparisons between different offenses.339 It may very well be that
comparisons between finely distinguished offense definitions is not
possible, leaving arrest distribution to be measured in terms of broader
categories. Such an approach would recognize that specific manifestations
of misconduct might be quite different in one part of a city than from
another.
However, the categories should not be as broad and
impressionistic as “disorderliness.”340 Nor should defining these categories
be left entirely to the intuitive judgments of police department
policymakers. As discussed above, these judgments should be subject to
judicial review.
Departmental discretion receives little attention, in part, because there
is little empirical information as to its dimensions and consequences.
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 600, 628 (2010) (criticizing the vagueness of Supreme
Court cases and arguing that it should review police checkpoints with strict scrutiny).
337
See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 160, at 834–35 (noting the importance of information
collection in the regulation of police).
338
See, e.g., Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 426 (estimating demographic profiles of
those engaged in drug selling).
339
But see WILSON, supra note 12, at 36 (contending that there is no such thing as like
cases in policing).
340
See supra notes 253–258 and accompanying text.
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Pointing to a high minority-arrest rate to substantiate a high offense rate is
circular.341 The vast majority of America’s police departments do not
systematically assemble data for arrests by race, offense, arresting unit,
geography, contraband seized, number of individuals arrested in the course
of an operation, and number of officer hours required for the operation.342
Such data would not only help illuminate the relationship between
departmental discretion and the demographic profile of arrestees, but also
cast light on proactive policing’s efficiency. Without such information, it is
impossible to address the discretion problem as a matter of equality or
efficiency.
Courts can help with the information gap. Among the great triumphs
of the racial profiling litigation in the 1990s and early 2000s has been the
number of record-keeping agreements that the settlements have
engendered.343 The information has, in turn, spawned considerable research
demonstrating the expense and futility of profiling in the traffic context. 344
As discussed above, DWB is not the best analogy for the problem of
institutional discretion. It is, however, a study in the cascading political and
social effects of increased information flow. DWB litigation generated
settlement agreements that bound police departments to collect and
disseminate demographic information for traffic stops. That information
has, in turn, helped generate greater public scrutiny of police practices.345 It
is only through litigation, whether over Freedom of Information Act
requests or substantive challenges to policy or practice,346 that academics
and advocates will secure access to the kinds of data that might prompt
greater transparency and information sharing. Increased information
sharing by itself is unlikely to guarantee police departments’ democratic
accountability, but it would be a good start.
If generating the kind of information described above is impracticable
or unduly expensive, it may be that randomization offers a second-best
approach to achieving equitable arrest distribution. Bernard Harcourt has
persuasively advanced randomization as an antidote to racial profiling and,
more generally, to the harmful distributive consequences of actuarial,
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See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 118–22 (describing various economic model studies
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345
See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 150; Sam Skolnik, Drug Arrests Target Blacks Most
Often, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2001, at B1.
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predictive technique in criminal justice.347 Randomization entails using a
randomized procedure for selecting targets of criminal enforcement, and
Harcourt’s examples include random numerical ordering of highway
vehicle stops or random selection of Social Security numbers for tax
audits.348 Randomization is primarily directed at ameliorating prediction’s
harmful consequences, such as disproportionate stops of minority
motorists.349 It is not explicitly concerned with policing’s benefits.
Notwithstanding, randomization could be a step in the direction of
managing proactive policing’s negative distributive consequences.
The proposal here, of course, breaks dramatically with existing
constitutional criminal procedure and equal protection jurisprudence.350
The Supreme Court has rejected disparate impact as a basis for equal
protection claims in most instances,351 and more generally, it has rejected
Ely’s vision of the Fourteenth Amendment as a device for correcting
political process failure.352 The Court is also unsympathetic to civil rights
claims in which the guilty challenge their convictions.353 In that vein, the
Court is particularly reluctant to entertain selective enforcement claims that
question law enforcement discretion.354 The Court’s jurisprudence is
symptomatic of guilt’s exaggerated moral import in legal and political
discussion. That jurisprudence pays no heed to departmental discretion’s
severe distributive consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to reconceptualize policing in two ways. First,
courts and scholars ought to consider police departments as discretionwielding agents separate and apart from individual officers. Departmental
discretion determines how arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction.
Geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics are
the key dimensions of departmental discretion in the proactive policing
347
See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 238–39 (noting that any person committing a given
crime should have the same probability of getting caught).
348
Id. at 238.
349
See id.
350
See supra Part II.B.
351
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
352
Compare ELY, supra note 323, at 170 (arguing there is no process failure if a majority
elects to impose a cost upon itself for the benefit of a minority group), with Adarand v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding affirmative action programs are to be subjected to strict
scrutiny even if the program represents the majority’s decision to impose a cost on itself).
353
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (refusing to permit 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction”).
354
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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context. Conceptualizing policing in terms of these choices brings the
relationship between departmental discretion and egalitarianism into stark
relief. That proactive policing generates a dramatically high minority-arrest
rate suggests that police departments are not making these choices with
sensitivity to equality. Neither courts nor legislatures give departments
direction on how to distribute proactive policing arrests. That should
change.
Second, distributive justice principles ought to guide the regulation of
departmental discretion in the proactive policing context. Distributive
justice suggests that police departments should distribute the benefits and
burdens associated with proactive policing in a manner that promotes
egalitarianism. John Ely’s theory of judicial review and courts’ already
central role in regulating criminal justice counsel in favor of courts
guaranteeing the egalitarian distribution of police departments’ punitive
power.
Over the last forty years, the United States has relied upon criminal
law enforcement as opposed to social welfare policies to address the
complicated problems that beset America’s poorest urban communities.355
That political and legal fact makes it all the more pressing that police
departments advance crime control in a manner that is equality-enhancing.
Distributive justice also lays the groundwork for questioning whether police
departments are well-suited for addressing the range of social problems they
currently face.356
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